ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the
  nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy
  systems by Gsponer, Andre & Hurni, Jean-Pierre
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
40
11
10
v3
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
 Fe
b 2
00
4 ITER:
The International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor
and the
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications
of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems
André Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni
Independent Scientific Research Institute
Box 30, CH-1211 Geneva-12, Switzerland
e-mail: isri@vtx.ch
ISRI-04-01.17 February 2, 2008
Abstract
This report contains two parts:
(1) A list of “points” highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical
reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed some-
times in early 2004.
(2) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications
of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical
points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics
of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale
tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF.
The conclusion of the report is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan,
which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-
driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States
or France), will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons pro-
liferation status, and foster further nuclear proliferation throughout the world.
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Foreword
“The atomic weight of hydrogen is not exactly 1, but by careful measurement
is found to be 1.0077. Who could imagine that in this slight discrepancy —
which indeed needs some explanation to make intelligible — an immense store of
possible energy is indicated, which some day, when we have learned how, may
become accessible for good or ill to the human race ? [...] And if ever the human
race get hold of a means of tapping even a small fraction of the energy contained
in the atoms of their own planet, the consequences will be beneficent or destructive
according to the state of civilization at that time attained.”
Sir Oliver Lodge, F.R.S.
Scientific American, May 1924
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Chapter 1
ITER Siting Issues
What follows is a collection of strategic-political and military-technical points that
should be addressed in relation to the siting and construction of an experimental
fusion reactor such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
(ITER), as well as more specific points to be considered in the case of Japan which
is the most likely country in which ITER will be sited.
This list is focused on the nuclear weapons proliferation issues and implica-
tions. It does not address the impact of ITER’s siting on international and national
fusion energy research policies. Neither does it attempt to give a comprehensive
view of the economic and political motivations of particular States in supporting
a given site. (We refer to the Appendix for a concise discussion of some of these
issues in the perspective of ITER’s siting in Japan.1)
Moreover, the points do not address the safety and environmental risks asso-
ciated with the operation of thermonuclear fusion facilities, which mainly come
from their use of massive amounts of hazardous materials such as tritium, lithium,
and beryllium: Accidental tritium dispersal, lithium fires, toxicity of beryllium,
etc. Similarly, it does not address the problems related to the production and safe
disposal of the large amounts of long-lived low-radioactive waste generated by
the activation of structural materials bombarded by the neutrons produced in the
fusion reactions [1, 2].
The points have been classified according to their main emphasis, leading to a
certain amount of repetition since there is considerable overlap between different
issues. For every one of these points references will be given, either to following
sections of this report, or to technical papers in which more details are given.
1We are indebt to Professor Clifford E. Singer for this discussion and other helpful comments
on an earlier version of this report.
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Concerning the political aspects, apart from a few specific references, we refer the
reader to the vast literature, and to the numerous newspapers articles and analyses,
in which many of the political-diplomatic points mentioned here are discussed by
political scientists or diplomats, rather than by physicists like the authors of this
report.
1.1 Mostly political points
• The January 30, 2003, decision of the United States to return to the ITER
project, almost five years after having withdrawn from it, was primarily the
result of the Office of Fusion Energy and its advisory panels desire to get
back into international thermonuclear plasma work seen as justifying the
whole fusion energy research effort, and was made possible by the gener-
ally pro-nuclear current U.S. administration and less anti-nuclear Congress.
However, it can be argued that this decision was also facilitated by polit-
ical considerations related to the “new nuclear arms-control environment”
created by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test of 1998 and the numerous
more recent events which culminated with the North Korean claim of having
assembled a number of nuclear weapons (see [3] and Sec.2.1).2 Since the
weapons now in the arsenals of these countries are deliverable by medium
to long-range missiles, they are most certainly “boosted” fission bombs,
meaning that they contain besides some fissile material (a few kilograms of
plutonium or enriched uranium) a small amount of fusion material (a few
grams of tritium) to make them sufficiently compact, safe, and reliable to
enable military deployment (See Fig.1 and Sec.2.2.1). For this reason, any
international enterprise such as the construction of ITER, in which kilo-
gram amounts of tritium are used, becomes a sensitive undertaking to which
the U.S. have to participate in order to have as much influence as possible
— especially since the current administration in Washington has taken a
much stronger stand on the strengthening of the U.S. nuclear arsenal than
on arms-control and disarmament.3
2Other political (and possibly financial) considerations must have included the commitments of
Canada and China to ITER, along with an expression of interest from South Korea. Since Canada
withdrew in December 2003, the current participants in negotiations on ITER construction are
China, the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Korea, and the USA.
3Some of the post-1998 and post-September-11 decisions of the U.S. government which have
significantly contributed in complicating the “new nuclear arms-control environment” are: The non-
ratification of the CTBT, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the deployment of a national missile
defense system, the possible modification of existing nuclear weapons into “earth penetrators” or
“bunker-buster,” etc.
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• Experimental fusion reactors such as ITER, as well the deployment of
commercial-scale fusion reactors, pose the problem of tritium proliferation
because their operation will imply the yearly use of kilograms of tritium
(See [7, Sec.6.2.5, p.28] and Sec.2.5.2), i.e., amounts comparable to those
used in an arsenal of several thousands “tritium-boosted” nuclear weapons.
For example, the total amount of tritium in the U.S. nuclear stockpile is on
the order of 100 kg, which corresponds to an average on the order of 10 g
per nuclear warhead.4
• The present stage of the ITER siting debate, in which a French site is
in competition with a Japanese site, reflects the current strategic-political
background: The European Union, Russia, and China are in favor of the
French site of Cadarache — which would locate ITER in a NPT-recognized
nuclear-weapon State; while the United States, South Korea, and Japan
are in favor of the Japanese site of Rokkasho [8] — which would locate
ITER in a non-nuclear-weapon State. An important reason for this split is
that the construction and operation of ITER will give the host country full
access to large-scale tritium technology — which is presently only available
to nuclear-weapon States and to Canada. Indeed, once in full operation,
ITER’s site inventory of tritium will be about 2 kg, and ITER’s tritium
consumption about 1.2 kg per year [7, Table 6.2.5-1, p.29].5
• As a non-nuclear-weapon State and active proponent of nuclear disarma-
ment, Japan is particularly sensitive to the new arms-control environment
created by the testing of weaponized nuclear devices by India and Pakistan
in 1998, and by the more recent North Korean claim of having assembled
4The National Academy of Science report of December 20, 2002, recommending that the
U.S. enter ITER negotiations and pursue an appropriate level of involvement in ITER, strongly
emphasizes the importance of ITER for demonstrating full-scale tritium burning and breeding
technology [4, p.5-7]. However, the word “proliferation” does not appear at all in the report.
Moreover, while concerns about “proliferation” are mentioned as a minor item in some official
documents such as the ITER Technical Basis report [5, Sec.5.2.4.1, p.6], they are generally described
in positive terms emphasizing that a pure fusion reactor such as ITER will not contain fission
materials. (For a discussion of hybrid fusion-fission reactors see Sec.2.5.1.) Similarly, the reports
of the Special Committee on the ITER Project of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission highlight
only the “reduced chances for nuclear weapons proliferation” in comparison with fission reactors
[6, p.266-267]: The problems with tritium proliferation and the close links between fusion energy
and thermonuclear weapons are never mentioned.
5For the record we mention that financial and other political considerations also play an
important role in the ITER siting debate. For instance, Japan is ready to pay 48% of construction
costs and 42% of operating cost. But part of the $30 billions total cost of ITER could compensate
for the suppression of the Iraqi dept to Japan, as well as for the cost of sending Japanese troops to
Iraq. Moreover, some French political leaders consider that “the American choice is explained by
a will to ‘punish’ France for its attitude during the Iraqi crisis” [9].
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a number of nuclear weapons. For instance “Japan has been particularly
adamant against the expanding of the number of states with nuclear weapons
‘status’ beyond the current (P-5) permanent veto members of the UN Secu-
rity Council” [3, p.16]. On the other hand, as a counterweight to this new
environment, Japan is likely to welcome the enhancement of the already
massive latent6 nuclear capability (provided by its fission reactor and re-
processing facilities) resulting from the siting of ITER in Japan — which
will give full access to large-scale tritium technology, and which in time
may require a large-scale indigenous tritium production capability, of a size
comparable to one sufficient to maintain a large thermonuclear arsenal.
• A fusion reactor program (in which every operating commercial-scale re-
actor requires an inventory of at least 10 kg of tritium, see Sec.2.5.2) gives
a non-military justification to acquire an industrial-scale tritium technology
— just like a fast-breeder reactor program (in which every reactor requires
an inventory of at least 1000 kg of plutonium) gave a civilian justifica-
tion to the industrial scale reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in countries
such as Japan. With the construction of a large fusion reactor, large-scale
tritium production in a non-nuclear-weapon State becomes “respectable,”
even though it is providing at the same time a status of latent (or virtual)
advanced nuclear-weapon-State.
• The nuclear weapons proliferations implications of the siting of ITER in
Japan is enhanced by the fact that Japan is already in possession of a large
stockpile of separated plutonium. Indeed, large-scale availability of tritium
would enable this reactor-grade plutonium to be used in highly efficient
and reliable nuclear explosives “boosted” by a few grams of tritium each
(see Fig.2 and Sec.2.2.1). Such boosted bombs are sufficiently compact to
be used as warheads in relatively unsophisticated long-range missiles, or
as primaries in two-stage thermonuclear bombs — in which reactor-grade
plutonium can also be used in a third-stage to enhance the yield (see Fig.4
and Sec.2.2.2).
• Considering that Japan already has a large inertial confinement fusion (ICF)
program comparable in ambition to those the United-States and France (see
Tables 2 and 3, and Sec.2.4), as well as an ambitious magnetic confinement
fusion (MCF) program,7 the access to large-scale tritium-handling, and
6For a discussion of the concept of “latent” (or “virtual”) nuclear weapons proliferation, which
refers to the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons components and to assemble them on short
notice, see sections 2.1 and 2.9 of this report.
7See reference [10] for an extensive discussion of past, present, and future ICF and MCF
research under the Japanese Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology.
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progressively to large-scale tritium-breeding, capabilities will put Japan in
a position similar to advanced nuclear-weapon-states with regards to the
making of very advanced nuclear weapons, as well as of fourth-generation
nuclear weapons in which fusion materials (i.e., deuterium, tritium, and
lithium) will be used instead of fissile materials as the main explosive.
• Like India and Pakistan, South Korea has already a militarily significant
indigenous tritium production capacity.8 This is because some tritium is
produced in the heavy-water of its four Canadian-built CANDU-type power
reactors, which also yield significant amounts of high-grade plutonium in
their spent fuel. Therefore, South Korea’s participation to the ITER collab-
oration will further enhance its latent nuclear-weapons capability, especially
if ITER is built in Japan. Consequently, it will become less likely that North
Korea will dismantel its nuclear weapons, which may encourage further
countries to develop an actual nuclear-weapons capability.
• The Japanese proposal of siting ITER at Rokkasho is related to its com-
mitment to complete and operate a controversial reprocessing plant under
construction at this site (see Appendix). This raises the possibility that ITER
could be built at Rokkasho instead of the reprocessing plant, which could be
seen as a more favorable option from the point of view of nonproliferation.
However, in the opinion of the authors of the present report, this is likely
not to be the case because Japan already has a large stockpile of separated
plutonium (so that reprocessing more fuel would not dramatically change
the situation with respect to access to fissonable material) while ITER will
enable Japan to go further in the direction of latent proliferation, and closer
to next-generation nuclear weapons which are likely to be of a pure-fusion
type.
• Since large-scale tritium technology is the only major thermonuclear weapon
related technology not yet available to Japan, the siting of ITER in Japan
may encouraged further smaller and larger countries around the world, in-
cluding highly industrialized countries such as Germany,9 to enhance their
latent nuclear weapons capability. A major responsibility of the countries
promoting ITER’s construction in a non-nuclear-weapon State such as Japan
is therefore the additional impetus that is given to the nuclear arms race.
8The devices tested by India and Pakistan in 1998 were boosted nuclear explosives. In North
Korea, the 5 MW(electric), 20–30 MW(thermal), experimental reactor at Yongbyon can produce
several kilograms of plutonium every year, or several tens of grams of tritium per year — enough
to maintain a small arsenal of half a dozen boosted fission bombs.
9Germany developed an indigenous tritium capability (comparable in scale to that of Japan)
which led to the sale of tritium extraction equipment to Pakistan in the 1980s [12, p.195].
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• Finally, we stress that latent nuclear weapons proliferation, and its perceived
value as a substitute for an actual nuclear weapons capability (see Sec.2.9),
are fully compatible with the letter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), de-
spite that modern technology makes that the differences between advanced
civilian-nuclear-powers and actual nuclear-weapon-States become less and
less significant (see Sec.2.10). In this context, visibility and transparency
are essential to prove the latent capability, which is enhanced by having a
large thermonuclear facility such as ITER on national territory rather than
elsewhere.
• In summary, building ITER at the Rokkasho site will turn Japan into a virtual
thermonuclear superpower. This will not be the result of a few deliberate
political decisions, but the consequence of many independent small steps,
which starting in the late 1940s institutionalized nuclear and thermonuclear
energy research in all countries, and turned them into powerful instruments
of foreign policy, because of their close connections with nuclear and ther-
monuclear weapons (see Sec.2.9). Like the dropping of an atomic bomb,
or the starting of a war of aggression, the next step — going from the
virtual to the actual state of proliferation — may then depend much less
on a democratic decision process than on the availability of the technol-
ogy, which is why the ITER siting decision should not be taken without a
thorough parliamentary assessment of all technical, political, and military
implications.
1.2 Problems related to tritium transportation, di-
version, and theft
• The transportation of large quantities of tritium to Japan is a new and partic-
ularly sensitive issue because at present most of the tritium never leaves the
national boundaries of nuclear-weapon States. The present-day industrial
and scientific uses of tritium are such that only relatively small amounts are
shipped between countries. On the other hand, “it is expected that about
25 kg of tritium will be transported during the course of ITER operations”
[8, p.18]. The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) “has some
previous experience with tritium transportation from Canada (3 times) and
the USA (6 times). It is estimated for the deuterium-tritium operation in
ITER that approximately 150 g of tritium is transported six times a year by
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using a transport package with a 50 g-tritium capacity each” [8, p.18].10
• Until now, all thermonuclear fusion facilities in which substantial amounts
of tritium are used were always built closed to a nuclear weapons facility or
research laboratory. This was the case, for example, of the Joint European
Torus (JET) which was built at Culham, i.e., near Aldermaston, the main
U.K. nuclear weapons research laboratory. In the case of the Japanese site
of Rokkasho, it can be argued that a U.S. military base is located nearby.11
However, if tritium transportation is made using this base instead of a civilian
entry point to Japan, national and international political problems are likely
to result.
• Considering the political, social, and environmental problems already en-
countered with the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and separated plu-
tonium between Europe and Japan, the transportation of large amounts of
tritium between Canada and Japan will add a new dimension to the risks
associated with nuclear energy. For this reason it is likely that once the
ITER siting decision will be taken, discussion will start on the construction
of a dedicated tritium production facility in Japan, e.g., possibly a system
based on the use of a high-intensity accelerator of the kind which is already
under development in Japan (see end of Sec.2.5.3).
• However, while the construction of a tritium production facility close to
ITER will decrease the need for transportation over long distancies, it will
not completely suppress the possibility of tritium diversion or theft.12
• The concealment of a military significant amount of tritium after a diversion
or theft is much easier than that of a comparable amount of plutonium. This
is because a militarily significant amount of tritium is comparatively much
smaller than a militarily significant amount of plutonium (see Sec.2.5.2), and
because tritium is much lighter, much less radioactive, and more difficult to
detect than plutonium.
• The problems of tritium diversion or theft are exacerbated by the fact that
small amounts of tritium can be used to considerably enhance the yield
of crude nuclear weapons that could be assembled by terrorists or minor
10For comparison, the current world tritium market corresponds to the shipment of about 100
g/year, mainly from Canada, and in very small batches.
11According to the International Herald Tribune: “The Japanese site has many assets: the
proximity of a port, a ground of solid bedrock and the close proximity of a US military base” [11].
12We do not suggest that tritium could be diverted into a clandestine Japanese weapons program:
As long as a latent proliferation status is implicitly perceived as giving sufficient guarantees for
developing an actual capability in case of need, there is no reason for a weapons program.
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rogue states using low-grade materials such as reactor-grade plutonium or
low-enriched uranium.
1.3 Technical points related to thermonuclear weapons
and their proliferation
• A few grams of tritium are sufficient to “boost” fission explosives made of a
few kilograms of military- or reactor-grade plutonium. (As is explained in
section 2.1, this is because tritium boosting obviates the preignition problems
which makes non-boosted plutonium weapons unreliable and unsafe). Such
boosted explosives are sufficiently compact to be used in relatively unso-
phisticated long-range missiles, or as primaries of two-stage thermonuclear
bombs (see Fig.4 and Sec.2.2.2).
• A few tens of grams of tritium are sufficient to “boost” the “sparkplug”
of the secondary of a two-stage thermonuclear weapon, which can then be
made sufficiently small to be deliverable by a missile. In such weapons
a “third-stage” made of a few tens of kilograms of fissile material is often
used to provide additional yield without increasing the size and weight of the
warhead. While this third-stage (i.e., essentially a “blanket” surrounding the
secondary of a two-stage H-bomb) is preferably made of enriched uranium, it
can also be made of reactor-grade plutonium without degrading the military
performance of the device, which may correspond to yields in the range of
200–500 kilotons equivalent TNT (see Fig.4 and Sec.2.2.2).
• Next-generation (i.e., fourth-generation) nuclear weapons will have sub-
stantially lower yields (i.e., tons instead of kilotons) and will rely on fusion
materials rather than on fissile materials for their main explosive charge (see
Sec.2.6.3). This means that the emphasis of safeguarding militarily useful
materials will gradually shift from fission materials such as plutonium to
fusion materials such as tritium.
• Both magnetic confinement fusion (MCF) reactors, such as ITER, and iner-
tial confinement fusion reactors (ICF), such as the GEKKO XII laser facility
of the Institute of Laser Engineering at Osaka University in Japan, have
nuclear-weapon-materials proliferation implications due to their use of tri-
tium (see Sec.2.5). However, ICF facilities have the additional proliferation
problem that they enable the physics of thermonuclear weapons to be stud-
ied in the laboratory (see Sec.2.6). As a result, it is well known by nuclear
proliferation experts that Japan has not only the capability to build boosted
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nuclear weapons, but also the potential to build two-stage thermonuclear
weapons that are likely to work first-time without testing.13 Today, the main
impediment that would prevent Japan from building such second-generation
nuclear weapons on short notice is the unavailability of sufficient amounts
of tritium.
• Any future commercial fusion reactor (based on the either the MCF or
ICF principle) poses the problem of tritium proliferation because during
operation each such reactor will contain several tens of kilograms of tritium,
i.e., enough for an arsenal of several hundreds or thousands thermonuclear
weapons (see Sec.2.5.2).
• Since 1 g of deuterium-tritium fuel produces about 340 GJ of energy, a
nominal 1 GW (electric) commercial fusion power plant with a thermal
efficient of 30% would consume 10 mg of DT -fuel per second.14 If the
plant is based on the MCF principle this amount of fuel is burnt relatively
slowly in a steady-state plasma confined by magnetic fields. However, if the
plant is based on the ICF principle, the fuel is burnt in a continuous salvo of
micro-thermonuclear-bombs (so-called “pellets”) exploding at the center of
a containment vessel. Assuming that one pellet is detonated each second,
the explosive yield of each pellet would be 3.4 GJ, i.e., equivalent to about
810 kg of TNT (see Sec.2.4).
• The many kilograms of tritium implied in the daily operation of a number of
GW-scale reactor in a fusion-based power industry will provide numerous
possibilities of diversion or theft of tritium for military or terrorist purposes.
With ICF reactors, one will have the additional problem of safeguarding
the fusion pellets themselves, because they may possibly be used as the
explosive charge of some future-generation nuclear weapons.
1.4 Japan’s expertise with tritium technology
• Japan’s scientific and technical experience with tritium goes back to 1956
with the delivery of the first supply of tritium from England to the Tritium
Research Center (now called Hydrogen Isotope Research Center) at Toyama
University.
13Quoting from a U.S. Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
study of 1995, “one cannot rule out that a technologically advanced country would be able to field
a very conservatively designed thermonuclear weapon that would present a credible threat without
nuclear testing” (see Sec.2.1 and Sec.2.2.1).
14This corresponds to a consumption of 0.5 kg of tritium per day.
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• Technical experience with gram amounts of tritium is currently available at
several Japanese laboratories, in particular at the Japan Atomic Energy Re-
search Institute (JAERI) at Tokai, where the technology for mass-producing
lithium-ceramic and beryllium pebbles to be used in tritium breeding blan-
kets of fusion reactors is being developed in collaboration with Japanese
industry [13]. These pebbles are likely to be used in ITER tritium breeding
experiments. But they could also be used in some future indigenous tritium
production facility. Further experience related to the use of tritium in ICF
pellets exists at the Institute of Laser Engineering at Osaka University.
• Since 1994 JAERI and U.S. scientists are collaborating in research and
development related to tritium production in a fusion blanket. This has
lead to actual tritium fuel processing experiments using the TSTA (Tritium
Systems Test Assembly) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory [14]. TSTA
is the only existing simulated loop of the fusion processing cycle of a fusion
reactor capable of handling about 100 grams of tritium.
• According to current plans described in the ITER Technical Basis it is
expected that ITER will be operated with all tritium supplied by external
sources. “The maximum total tritium transportation per year will be about
1.2 kg/year in the first ten years. Assuming a 50 g tritium transport container,
there will be two shipments every month” [7, Sec.6.2.5, p.28]. “A reasonable
estimate of the available tritium from Canada [where tritium is bred as a
byproduct of the operation of twenty CANDU-type reactors], for example,
is: 22 kg in storage by 2009; 1.5 kg/year from 2009” [7, Sec.6.2.5, p.28].
• It is expected that “the CANDU tritium supply [from Canada] will be avail-
able for use in ITER in its initial phase of operation, but will not enable ITER
to run its extended phase of operation at reasonable device availability” [15].
However, “typical tritium production capacity from fission reactors specially
designed for tritium production is only a few kg per year, and at the pro-
hibitive cost of about $200 million dollars per kg” [15]. This calls for
new tritium production facilities, e.g., accelerator or dedicated fusion-based
tritium breeders. Moreover, according to a Los Alamos study on tritium
supply for ITER : “Development and deployment of program components
which breed significant quantities of tritium are needed soon” [16].
• Once the supply of tritium from Canada will be exhausted (because of the
foreseeable shut-down of aging CANDU reactors), or in case of a problem
with transportation, the most logical source of tritium would be a dedicated
facility in the host country. This could be a justification for an accelerator
breeder system, based on a high-intensity proton accelerator of the kind
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considered in Japan (and in South Korea) for neutron science and nuclear
waste transmutation (see end of Sec.2.5.3). To have such a production
facility available in due time, development is to start soon [16].
• In summary, while Japan has now experience and facilities to handle tritium
in gram amounts, it has not yet access to kilogram-amount tritium production
and processing technology, nor the justification to develop it. However, if
ITER is built in Japan, the problems with transportation and medium to long-
term tritium supply will provide many political and technical justifications
to go ahead with a full-scale national tritium production program.
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Chapter 2
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Issues of Thermonuclear-Fusion
Energy Systems
2.1 Introduction
In the past decade there has been a growing awareness that the development of ther-
monuclear fusion systems is being accompanied by the spread of the knowledge
and materials required for the production of thermonuclear weapons.
This awareness is the result of a number of political and technical developments
which shifted part of the nuclear weapons proliferation’s debate away from its tra-
ditional focus (namely the nuclear-fission fuel cycle and its related enrichment and
reprocessing technologies) and started to highlight the military and political prob-
lems associated with emerging nuclear energy systems: Thermonuclear-fusion
systems for energy production and nuclear weapons simulation, accelerator-based
concepts for energy amplification and tritium breeding, pulsed-power technologies
for civilian and military applications, etc.
Some of the more important political events which contributed to this shift
include the U.S. Government declassification act of 1993 which “legitimized” the
growing involvement of non-nuclear-weapon States in the development of inertial
confinement fusion systems; the last round of French and Chinese underground nu-
clear tests which highlighted the importance of actual data for comparison with the
output of future computer simulation programs; the negotiation and the conclusion
of a Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) which saw the opposition of
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India to the other parties because computer simulations and laboratory tests were
not included in the scope of the treaty; and the establishment of extensive and
well-funded nuclear weapons simulation and “stockpile stewardship” programs in
the United States and France which confirmed the primordial importance of large
laser-fusion facilities for these purposes.
On the other hand, a surprising number of significant technological break-
throughs were made during the same period: An increase by a factor of one million
of the intensity of ultrashort-pulselength high-power tabletop lasers, the capturing
and cooling of antimatter, the discovery of high-temperature superconductors, the
design of high-performance electromagnetic guns, the synthesis of super-heavy
elements and the discovery of several unexpected new types of nuclear species
(non-fissile shape isomers, medium-weight superdeformed nuclei, halo nuclei,
etc.), the emergence of nanotechnology as a radical approach to the fabrications
of new materials and micromechanisms, the development of new techniques for
constructing ever more powerful supercomputer, etc. All these technologies have
direct military applications, for both non-nuclear and nuclear weapons, as well
as many applications for possible next-generation nuclear weapons and various
future thermonuclear energy systems.
However, much more than these evolutionary changes, the most important
nuclear-proliferation event of this last decade is certainly the May 1998 decision
of India to explode five first- and second-generation nuclear devices (including
a two-stage hydrogen bomb),1 which after two weeks of suspense and intense
diplomatic activity were reciprocated by Pakistan with a series of six nuclear
explosions.2
Indeed, it soon became clear that if the bombs included in the tests were
relatively compact devices ready for delivery by aircrafts or missiles, they were
not some kind of “crude” second-world-war type of weapons, but fairly advanced
“tritium-boosted” devices — as are, most probably, those recently claimed to have
been assembled by North Korea.3 This highlighted the fact that thermonuclear-
1A plausible description of the five Indian tests is as follows: one of the tests was a “certification
test” of a conservative weaponized design that must be part of the current Indian arsenal, the “high-
yield test” was a crude two-stage hydrogen bomb, and the “low-yield tests” were three advanced
boosted devices for use as tactical weapons or H-bomb primaries.
2There is less technical information on the six Pakistani tests. However, according to an
interview of Abdul Quader Kahn, the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear program, the devices were
high efficiency, highly reliable enriched uranium devices. “One was a big bomb which had a yield
of about 30–35 kilotons [...]. The other four were small, tactical weapons of low yield.” In an
other interview, he confirmed that “the devices tested on 28 May were boosted weapons, as were
some of the Indian tests.”
3The 5 MW(e), 20–30 MW(th), experimental reactor at Yongbyon can produce several kilo-
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fusion materials such as tritium, and the related scientific/technical knowhow, are
just as important as the much better known nuclear-fission materials for making
deliverable nuclear weapons. Moreover, it reminded that if countries like India,
Pakistan, and North Korea were able to deploy such weapons, countries that are
relatively much more advanced in science and technology should easily be able
to do the same, or better, especially if they have access to advanced nuclear and
thermonuclear facilities.
As a result, the current situation with nuclear weapons proliferation is in almost
every way different and more complex than it was only a couple of years ago. For
instance, the term “proliferation of nuclear weapons” used to cover (i) the increase
in the number and the quality of such weapons within the five “official” nuclear-
weapon States (namely4 China, France, Russia the U.K. and the U.S.A.); and (ii)
the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. While the former is known as
vertical proliferation, the latter is called horizontal proliferation.
Today, with an overall trend towards a decrease in the number of deployed
nuclear weapons in the “official” nuclear-weapon States, the emphasis of vertical
proliferation is shifting away from the problem of more and better nuclear weapons
to the question of the feasibility of modifying existing types of nuclear weapons for
new missions such as deep earth penetration, or of radically new types of nuclear
weapons, i.e., fourth-generation nuclear weapons, that could possibly be better
adapted to perceived new military needs.
Similarly, with the stabilization and the possible decrease in the number of ad-
ditional countries likely to acquire first- and second-generation nuclear weapons,5
the traditional horizontal proliferation concern (which mainly focussed on the pos-
sible spread of fission-weapons) is shifting to the problem of the proliferation of
thermonuclear-fusion weapons technology (and possibly of the technology of even
more advanced types of nuclear weapons) to Israel, India, and Pakistan, as well
as to countries which already have the technical capability to build nuclear-fission
weapons but which have decided not to build them.
Indeed, as we now know for a fact, during the 1950s to the 1980s, a number
of larger and smaller industrialized countries6 have acquired the technical and in-
grams of plutonium every year, or several tens of grams of tritium per year — enough to maintain
a small arsenal of half a dozen boosted fission bombs.
4Article IX of the Nonproliferation treaty of 1968 defines a nuclear-weapon States as “one
which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
1 January 1967.”
5E.g., in alphabetical order, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, South
Korea, Ukraine, Taiwan, etc.
6E.g., in alphabetical order, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland,
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dustrial capability (e.g., by means of “peaceful” nuclear activities) to manufacture
nuclear weapons components and to assemble them on short notice. Because such
an approach to a nuclear weapon capability is inherently ambiguous and does not
force a nation to signal or even decide in advance its actual intentions, it is termed
latent proliferation [17].7
Moreover, it is now also recognized that some large industrialized countries,
e.g., Japan and Germany, have extended their latent proliferation capability to the
point where they could make not only atomic bombs but also hydrogen bombs that
could be built and delivered with a very high probability of success. In fact, quoting
from the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation,
“one cannot rule out that a technologically advanced country would
be able to field a very conservatively designed thermonuclear weapon
that would present a credible threat without nuclear testing” [21, p.27].
It is in this context of growing technical complexity and expanding political
ambiguity that this review is written. In order to reduce some of the uncertain-
ties associated with this situation, and to make the links between thermonuclear
weapons and thermonuclear fusion energy systems as clear as possible, it is there-
fore important to start by reviewing the main technical concepts. This is done in
section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 were some basic information on thermonuclear weapons
and fusion energy systems is recalled and updated to fit into the contemporary de-
bate. The proliferation implications that are common to all thermonuclear fusion
energy systems will be addressed in section 2.5. Then, the more specific im-
plications of the main fusion systems (i.e., inertial confinement fusion, ICF, and
magnetic confinement fusion, MCF) will be expounded in sections 2.6 and 2.7,
leaving for section 2.8 those of one example of the many alternative fusion systems
(AFS) that are being developed concurrently. Finally, before concluding, section
2.9 will discuss some aspects of the problem of openness versus secrecy in matters
of thermonuclear energy and thermonuclear explosives, and their implications for
the latent proliferation of thermonuclear weapons.
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, etc.
7In 1993-95, the concept of virtual nuclear arsenals has been suggested to describe a world
in which all assembled, ready-for-use nuclear weapons would be banned [18]. This would link
latent proliferation to deterrence in a way that has been termed factory deterrence by political
scientists [19], or technical deterrence, scientific deterrence, or deterrence by competence, by
nuclear weapons designers [20]. In this review, we use the adjectives “latent” and “virtual”
interchangeably to refer to the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons components and to
assemble them on short notice.
2.2 Thermonuclear weapons
Despite the tight secrecy that covers the technical details of how nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons are built, their principles are sufficiently well known to
be described fairly accurately [22].
Using the wording of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of declassification,
the fundamental idea is that, “in thermonuclear weapons, radiation from a fission
explosive can be contained and used to transfer energy to compress and ignite a
physically separate component containing thermonuclear fuel” [23]. This is the
essence of the so-called “Teller-Ulam” principle that was declassified by the U.S.
in 1979, and which is used in all modern fusion explosives.
In practice, in order to apply this principle and build a device that is sufficiently
small to be deliverable by an aircraft or a missile, it was necessary to first minia-
turize the fission bomb (also called the trigger, or the primary) that is producing
the radiation (i.e., soft x-rays) necessary to compress and ignite the fusion material
(also called the secondary, or second-stage). This miniaturization was achieved
by using a small amount of deuterium and tritium, a thermonuclear fuel mixture,
to enhance the performance of a fission bomb (See Fig.1). This technique is called
“boosting” because it was first developed in order to increase the yield of fission
bombs. Boosting is now primarily used to decrease the overall weight and size
of fission bombs of a given yield, as well as to dramatically increase their safety.
Since boosting is presently used in essentially all modern nuclear weapons (i.e., in
all tactical or strategic weapons within all contemporary nuclear arsenals, includ-
ing Israel, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) it is important to explain this
technique in some details.
2.2.1 Boosted fission bombs
Figure 2 is a simplified diagram of a boosted fission device. Its core consists of a
plutonium and/or enriched uranium shell (the “pit”) surrounded by a stainless steel
case, possibly a neutron reflector, and by chemical explosives. This corresponds to
the present-day concept of sealed pits, with the fissile material permanently sealed
within the high explosives. A short time before detonating the device, the pit is
filled with a few grams of a deuterium-tritium (DT ) gas mixture at a pressure of
a few tens of atmospheres.
When the weapon is detonated, the pit and the case are imploded by the high
explosives at the same time as the DT gas. As the pit collapses into a solid ball,
the DT is compressed into a sphere of a few millimeter radius with a density tens
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of times greater than its normal solid-phase density. At the same time the fissile
material is compressed to a few times its normal density and the fission chain
reaction starts.
As the chain reaction develops the fissile materials begins to emit x-rays and
neutrons which heat the DT at the center of the device. The temperature of this
mixture of fusionable materials therefore rises at the same time as the temperature
of the fissile material. This leads to a remarkable phenomenon which is the cause
of the boosting process: the fusion fuel ignites before the fission chain reaction is
terminated [22].
Therefore, at a time when the diverging chain reaction has generated a yield
that is still negligible, the DT mixture burns out very quickly and generates a very
intense pulse of high-energy neutrons by the thermonuclear reaction: D + T −→
4He + n . These fusion neutrons interact with the fissile material, causing it to
fission, and therefore to generate most of the yield of the explosion. In other words,
with boosting, the yield of a fission explosive is controlled by the very fast neutron
burst from the thermonuclear reactions: the fissile material (apart from heating the
fusion fuel to ignition) is essentially a passive neutron and energy amplifier in the
final stage of the nuclear explosion. This leads to several important conclusions:
1) With boosting, it is possible to build a relatively high yield fission explosive
which is fairly compact because it uses only a relatively small amount of high
explosives to implode the fissile material. The device can also be made relatively
light-weight because a thick neutron reflector and/or a heavy tamper surrounding
the fissile material are not necessary.
2) In an actual weapon, before arming the device, the DT mixture, or just
the tritium, is stored outside of the pit in a separate reservoir. This facilitates
maintenance and insures that boosting will not happen in case of an accidental
detonation of the high explosives. Since the amount of high explosives needed
to implode a boosted-device is only on the order of a few kilograms, a boosted
fission-weapon is extremely safe because an accidental nuclear explosion is almost
impossible to take place. This increased safety is the most important single factor
which enabled so many nuclear weapons to be deployed for so many year. It is also
the main reason why threshold nuclear States such as India, Israel, Pakistan, and
North Korea rely on tritium-boosting technology to maintain a credible nuclear
arsenal.8
8The gun-assembly type enriched-uranium weapons that were built by South Africa are an
example of a very unsafe design. This reduces substantially the merit of the South African
government for having dismanteled these weapons. In the case of Pakistan, it is unlikely that their
nuclear deterrent would be based on primitive gun-assembly or implosion type weapons: besides
from being unsafe, they would be much too heavy and cumbersome to be delivered by the aircrafts
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3) The most important technical aspects of boosting (e.g., that during the implo-
sion of the pit by chemical explosives the fusion fuel gets sufficiently compressed
without mixing with the fissile material) can be tested without actually starting
fission or fusion reactions. This can be done outside of the scope of the CTBT, and
only requires conventional equipments that are available in most high-explosive
research laboratories.
4) Using boosting, it is straightforward to build highly efficient and reliable
fission weapons using reactor-grade plutonium. In particular, the possibility of
a preinitiation of the chain reaction, which creates difficulties in making a non-
boosted fission bomb [24, 25], is no longer a serious problem. In fact, two of
the five devices tested by India in May 1998 are believed to have used plutonium
that was not classified as weapons grade [26]. Moreover, independently of the
type of fissile material used, the construction of “simple” and “deliverable” tritium-
boosted nuclear weapons can be easier than the construction of primitive Hiroshima
or Nagasaki type atomic bombs: the main problem is to acquire the few grams of
tritium that are needed for every weapon (see Fig.1).
Therefore, in summary, the very important advance in fission weapons consti-
tuted by boosting [27, p.312], and the fact that boosted bombs used as primaries are
“lower-bounding the size and mass of hydrogen bombs” [27, p.313], confirm the
tremendous importance of tritium9 from the point of view of the nonproliferation
of fission weapons.
2.2.2 Two-stage hydrogen bombs
Let us return to the design of a two-stage thermonuclear weapon. Its general
principle, the Teller-Ulam method, was given at the beginning of this section,
and is recalled in the caption of Fig.3. As with boosting, two conditions have to
be satisfied: (a) the thermonuclear fuel has to be sufficiently compressed for the
fusion reaction to be fast enough, and (b) the thermonuclear fuel has to be brought
to a sufficiently high temperature for the fusion fuel to be ignited. Both conditions
can be satisfied by using a boosted fission bomb as a powerful source of x-rays.10
available in their air-force, or by their 1500 km range “Ghauri” missile that was tested for the first
time shortly before the Indian government decided to become a declared nuclear power. Similarly,
in the case of North Korea, boosted fission devices are required for delivery by their long-range
missiles.
9And therefore of thermonuclear fusion technology.
10This is why boosting is so important: the energy of the fission explosion (which is mostly
heat in the form of x-rays) can easily radiate away from the fissile core without being attenuated
by the thick neutron reflector and the large amounts of high-explosives that would be needed for a
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Referring to Fig.3, the Teller-Ulam method is as follows: a fission bomb and
a container filled with fusion fuel (the secondary) are placed within a common
enclosure (the radiation case); while the radiation case and the envelope of the
secondary (the pusher/tamper) are made of heavy materials opaque to x-rays, the
remaining space within the radiation case (the hohlraum) is filled with light-weight
materials transparent to x-rays; as the primary fissions, large amounts of x-rays
are radiated ahead of blast and instantaneously fill the hohlraum; x-ray radiation
trapped within the hohlraum rapidly turns the hohlraum filling into a hot plasma;
radiation-driven thermalization insures that this plasma has very uniform pressure
and temperature so that its effects on the secondary are the same from all sides; the
plasma reradiates longer wavelength x-rays that are absorbed by the surface of the
secondary; the surface of the secondary (the pusher/tamper) is heated to the point
where it vaporizes and material is ejected from it; the material ablated from the
pusher/tamper causes by reaction a pressure which pushes it inwards, imploding
the fusion fuel to very high densities. This satisfies condition (a).
Condition (b), ignition, is achieved by an optional element not yet discussed:
the sparkplug at the center of the secondary in Fig.3. It consists of a subcritical
amount of fissionable material compressed at the same time as the secondary.
Because of the intense neutron background resulting from the explosion of the
primary, a fission chain reaction starts in the sparkplug as soon as it becomes
critical (in order to avoid a fizzle, and to maximize the yield from the sparkplug, it
is generally boosted by a small amount of DT , on the order of 10 grams). Hence,
with a careful design, the sparkplug will explode just when the thermonuclear
fuel is imploded to its maximum density. It will then provide, in the form of x-
rays, neutrons and additional compression from within, a large amount of energy
sufficient to insure that ignition will start even in the worst case.
Once the fusion reaction starts, the fusion fuel (e.g., liquid deuterium in the
first H-bomb, dry deuterated lithium (Li6D) in the modern H-bombs, possibly
liquid deuterium-tritium in “neutron bombs,” etc.) will burn as long as it will
be contained by the “tamping effect” (i.e., inertia) provided by the weight of the
unablated part of the pusher/tamper. Hence the dual function of the envelope of
the secondary: “pusher” during the ablative compression process, “tamper” during
the thermonuclear burn and expansion of the fusion fuel.11
Consequently, when Edward Teller invented the sparkplug concept, soon after
discovering with Stan Ulam in 1951 a means for achieving very high compressions,
the whole scheme became thoroughly convincing. Indeed, as will be stressed much
non-boosted fission bomb.
11A third possible function or the pusher/tamper, to be discussed at the end of this section, is to
provide additional explosive yield.
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later (1983) by Carson Mark, the Los Alamos physicist who led the theoretical
work on the first hydrogen bomb: “Almost immediately (the Teller and Ulam
method) gave promise of a feasible approach to thermonuclear weapons, provided
only the design work be done properly” [28, p.162]. Thus, a major feature of the
Teller-Ulam design is that it provides a straightforward and intrinsically fail-safe
method for making a thermonuclear bomb. In fact, this method is so good that all
the first hydrogen bombs of the five nuclear-weapon States worked the first time.12
Most recently, this fact was confirmed by India: it exploded a two-stage hydrogen
bomb in the series of five tests which was its second experimental campaign, 24
years after its first single experiment of 1974.13 According to an official Indian
statement, the device worked as expected, providing a total fission-fusion yield
of about 43 kilotons, a value that was intentionally kept low “to meet stringent
criteria like containment of the explosion and least possible damage to buildings
and structures in the neighboring villages.”
A sketch of a modern thermonuclear bomb is given in Fig.4. One recognizes
the same elements as in Fig.3, which are found in all thermonuclear explosives,
with a number of variations. For instance, while the secondaries of early H-
bombs were generally cylindrical, the most modern ones are probably of spherical
shape. In that case, instead of being made of plutonium or U235, the sparkplug
could be a DT fuze which ignites the Li6D fuel when optimum compression is
reached. Finally, by chosing for the pusher/tamper an appropriate heavy material
it is possible to control the total yield of a thermonuclear weapon. This is because
the high-energy (i.e., 14 MeV) neutrons produced by fusion have sufficient energy
to fission any kind of transuranic material such as all isotopes of uranium and
plutonium. Therefore, while the minimum yield of a given thermonuclear design
will be provided by using a non-fissionable heavy material such as lead or bismuth
as the tamper, the use of depleted (i.e., mostly isotope 238), natural, or highly
enriched (i.e., mostly isotope 235) uranium will provide a range of increasing
yields because more and more fission reactions will be produced in the tamper.
This is why the pusher/tamper is sometimes called the “third-stage” of a
thermonuclear weapon. For example, assuming as in Fig.4 that the yield is 150kt
if the pusher/tamper is made ofU238, the yield will be 300kt if the pusher/tamper is
made ofU235. On the other hand, if the pusher/tamper is made of a lead or bismuth,
the yield will be significantly lower, on the order of 50kt. This is most probably
what the Indian scientists have done in 1998 in order to be able to detonate the
device at a relatively low depth into the ground, and to minimize the background
12This is why there is no doubt that any technologically advanced country can build a militarily
usable hydrogen bomb without nuclear testing [21, p.27].
13Similarly, China detonated its first full-yield hydrogen bomb after only three fission bomb
tests, one boosted-fission test, and one preliminary two-stage hydrogen bomb principle test.
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signals which may overload the measuring instrumentation.
Finally, if plutonium is used for the pusher/tamper a yield somewhat higher
than with enriched uranium is obtained. This is why using plutonium for the “third
stage” is providing the highest possible yield for a given design. This option has
been implemented in some of the French thermonuclear weapons, and was an
important justification for the French fast-breeder program,14 as it could be for the
Indian plutonium reprocessing/recycling program [26]. Consequently, although
plutonium has some environmental disadvantages because it is more radioactive
than U235, it offers an attractive alternative to the large-scale production of highly
enriched uranium because plutonium of any grade can be used for the “third stage”
of a thermonuclear weapon. Therefore, any country such as Japan which has a
large stockpile of separated plutonium will not need access to large amounts of
U235 should it decide to make high-yield thermonuclear weapons.
2.3 Fusion energy systems and military technologies
The main fundamental difference between fission and fusion energy systems is
that the feasibility of fusion energy is still not proven, whereas the scientific and
technical feasibility of fission was established right from the beginning. Moreover,
in 1942, the construction and operation of the first “atomic pile” by Enrico Fermi
and his collaborators proved to be so simple that it was possible to design, build
and put into operation several full-scale, 1000 MW size, reactors in less than two
years! In comparison, after almost fifty years of fusion energy research, even the
most optimistic scientifically-competent proponent of fusion energy would not bet
to see an operating thermonuclear reactor in his life-time.
As a result, “thermonuclear fusion” is essentially a vast research program in
which many different concepts are still competing to possibly emerge as a techni-
cally, economically, and politically viable new source of energy. However, com-
pared to other energy research programs, fusion research is primarily done within
(or in close collaboration with) military establishments for at least three reasons:
First, they generally make use of high-energy density technologies which have
many military applications in areas such as radars, ordnance, detonics, weapons-
14In 1978, less than a year after the construction of the fast-breeder Superphenix had been
undertaken, General Jean Thiry, former director of the French nuclear test site in the Pacific Ocean,
advisor of the Managing Director of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), wrote: “France
is able to build atomique weapons of all types and all yields. At relatively low cost, she will be in
a position to produce large quantities of such weapons, with fast breeders providing an abundant
supply of the plutonium required.” Le Monde, 19 January 1978.
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physics and weapons-effects simulation, etc. Second, any type of working fusion
system would be a powerful source of energy, neutrons, and militarily important
materials such as tritium. Third, any working fusion system that could be made
sufficiently compact would be a potential pure-fusion15 weapon, and could be used
as an explosive or as a radiation weapon.
Therefore, when examining the possibility of “non-electric power generation”
applications of thermonuclear fusion, one finds mostly dual-purpose civil-military
applications. This is clearly the case with the conclusions of a 2003 report to the
U.S. DOE Future Energy Science Advisory Committee (FESAC), which found
that the most promising opportunities for non-electric applications of fusion fall
into four categories [29]:
1. Near-Term Applications (production of medical isotopes and of neutrons for
Homeland Security missions);
2. Transmutation (of nuclear waste or surplus weapons-grade plutonium);
3. Hydrogen Production (for transportation);
4. Space Propulsion (for heavy payload deep-space or manned missions).
A further aspect which complicates the discussion of fusion energy systems
is that the technologies on which they are based also have many scientific ap-
plications,16 as well as considerable overlap with those of nuclear fission energy
systems. In fact, as is shown by the systematics of the numerous existing and pro-
posed (thermo)nuclear energy systems: fission, fusion, and various high-energy
beam processes, and their related technologies, are interdependent in many ways
[30].17
For example, in the production of energy from fission or fusion, high-energy
beam technology is important because fusion is commonly initiated using such
beams (e.g., by heating a plasma in MCF, or compressing a DT pellet in ICF),
while fusion or fission materials (e.g., tritium or plutonium) can be produced using
15The concept of “pure-fusion” refers to the idea of burning or exploding fusion-fuel without
using fission-reactions or a fission-explosive as a primary.
16Which is why the quest for “pure knowledge” is often used as a justification for developing
technologies which enable the study of extreme states of matter which only exist in nuclear weapons
and stellar explosions.
17The growing interdependence of fission, fusion, acceleration, and laser technologies have
also been noted by international lawyers. It is reflected by the scope of recent export-control and
technology transfert agreements such as the “Warsaw guidlines” and the “Wassenaar arrangements,”
and of UN sanctions against nuclear-proliferating countries [31].
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particle accelerators, or enriched using lasers. Similarly, in its direct application
to military objectives, high-energy beam technology is important for directed-
energy applications such as anti-ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite beam
weaponry, while compact fission or fusion reactors are important for powering
military ships, submarines, spacecrafts, and directed energy weapons.
Moreover, many ancillary technologies associated with thermonuclear fusion
and high-energy beams are of great military importance: High-power radio-
frequency generation for radars and electromagnetic warfare, superconductivity
and cryogenics for outer-space military platforms, high magnetic field genera-
tion for magnetic compression and pure-fusion explosives, pulsed-power technol-
ogy for flash x-ray radiography and electromagnetic guns, heatproof and heavy-
irradiation-proof materials and electronic devices for conventional and nuclear
explosives, micro- and nano-technology for mass-producing fourth-generation
nuclear weapons, etc.
In the following sections several of these military applications will be described
in some details. They will generally come about as examples of implications (or
“spin-offs”) of various schemes which have a theoretical potential to become a
source of thermonuclear energy if some intrinsic limitations are overcome. Most
of the time, these spin-offs will not be directly connected to nuclear weapons or
proliferation per se. However, in all cases, it will be seen that the military and
proliferation impacts are sufficiently important to be of serious concern, especially
in non-nuclear-weapon States, because research on these ambiguous technologies
can be legitimized by their theoretical potential as future sources of energy.
To conclude this section, and before proceeding to a systematic analysis of
fusion energy systems, it is important to remark that it is a legitimate right for
all countries to pursue some exploratory research on all possible scientific devel-
opments that might have a revolutionary impact on military technology. In this
respect, it is precisely in the area where fission, fusion and high-energy beam
technologies overlap that the potential for new types of weapons is the greatest.
Moreover, if this set of now relatively standard technologies is extended to in-
clude more advanced atomic and nuclear processes (see Table 1), we see that there
is a relatively large number of physical processes available, which all have the
potential to release large amount of energy on a short time scale, and which are
therefore amenable to the design of new types of military explosives. This can be
seen as a confirmation that atomic and nuclear physics are relatively new sciences,
and an indication that many surprising discoveries are still possible, with many
implications for new types of nuclear explosives.
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2.4 Principles of magnetic and inertial confinement
fusion systems
Since fusion reactions happen only at extremely high temperatures, the burning
fusion fuel is a plasma, i.e., a collections of electrons and atomic nuclei from
which the electrons have been stripped away. Such a plasma cannot be contained
by the wall of any vessel and must therefore be confined, either by gravitation
as is the case in the sun18, or by electromagnetic fields if the reaction has to be
continuous, or else by its own inertia if the reaction is pulsed (as is the case in
nuclear weapons).
This defines the two main categories of magnetic confinement fusion (MCF)
and inertial confinement fusion (ICF) systems. To these two generic categories one
has to add many alternative fusion systems (AFS) which use the basic features of
MCF and ICF in various configurations and combinations,19 and in association with
various technologies such as pulsed electromagnetic power, energy cumulation,
muon catalysis, etc. Even though they are often called “innovative,” “emerging,”
or “new,” most of these alternative or unconventional fusions systems have been
extensively studied in military laboratories starting in the 1950-1960s, just like
MCF and ICF systems.
Even though the details of magnetic confinement fusion (MCF) systems are
very complicated, the general concept is sufficiently simple and intuitive that we do
not need to go into these details: It is enough for our purpose to say that we have a
magnetically confined high-temperature plasma steadily burning in a vessel which
is heated by the energy released by the fusion reactions, and coupled to a turbine to
make electricity. While different kind of thermonuclear fuels could be considered
in theory, its is likely that MCF is only feasible using deuterium-tritium as the fuel,
so that the main thermonuclear reaction is D+ T −→ 4He+ n+ (2.8× 10−12J) .
The concept of inertial confinement fusion (ICF) is that a sequence of tiny
fuel pellets containing deuterium and tritium are projected towards the center of
a reaction chamber where high-power laser or particle beam pulses strike each
pellet, compressing and heating its fuel, and releasing thermonuclear energy by
the reaction: D + T −→ 4He + n + (2.8 × 10−12J) . This nuclear energy is
converted into thermal energy in an absorbing blanket lining the inner surface of
the reaction chamber, and coupled to a turbine to make electricity.
18The thermonuclear reactions which “power” the sun are the “carbon-cycle” and “proton-set”
fusion reactions. They are extremely slow and have nothing to do with the “deuterium-tritium”
based fusion reactions used in nuclear weapons and in all practically feasible fusion reactors.
19Hence the sometimes used term magnetic-inertial confinement (MIC) fusion.
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Since 1 g of DT produces about 340 GJ of energy, a nominal 1 GW (electric)
fusion power plant with a thermal efficient of 30% would consume 10 mg of DT
per second.20 If we assume that one pellet is detonated each second, the explosive
yield of each pellet would be 3.4 GJ, i.e., equivalent to about 810 kg of TNT.
Figure 5 is a simplified diagram of an advanced indirect-drive ICF target of the
kind that is extensively studied for future ICF reactors. Such a target consists of
a hohlraum containing a 1–10 mg DT fuel pellet. The concept of indirect drive
refers to the fact that in this type of target the driver energy is not directly deposited
onto an outer layer of the fuel but is first converted into thermal x-rays confined
in a hohlraum. In the U.S., this concept was declassified in 1979 at the same time
as the Teller-Ulam principle (Fig.3), using a wording that is almost identical: “In
some ICF targets, radiation from the conversion of the focused energy (e.g., laser
or particle beam) can be contained and used to compress and ignite a physically
separate component containing thermonuclear fuel” [23, p.103].
It is therefore not surprising that Fig.3 and Fig.5 are very similar, except for the
technique used to generate the soft x-rays filling the hohlraum. In laser driven ICF,
the hohlraum is generally a cylinder with openings at both ends to allow the laser
beams to heat the inner surface of the hohlraum, causing emission of x-rays. In
heavy-ion driven ICF, the heavy-ions are stopped in converters (i.e., small pieces
of high-Z materials placed within the hohlraum) which are strongly heated. With
other drivers, e.g., light-ion beams or antiprotons, the details would be different,
but the result the same: strong heating of the radiation case or of the converters
leading to x-ray emission into the hohlraum. Hence, any type of indirect drive ICF
system will enable the simulation of H-bomb physics in the laboratory.
A major problem, as for hydrogen bombs, is to succeed in compressing the
pellet to a very high density and igniting the fuel. This is why the largest ICF
system under construction in the United States is called the National Ignition
Facility because its main objective (which is same as those of its French and
Japanese competitors) is to achieve ignition. (See Table 2 for a list of the most
important laser ICF facilities in the world.)
The difficulty of this task is enormous, and it would be advantageous to find
a technique similar to Teller’s “sparkplug” concept which considerably simplified
the design of H-bombs. Several such techniques are under investigation, and one
of the most promising is based on the invention of the “superlaser,” which enabled
a factor of one million increase of the power of table-top lasers.
“Superlasers” are ultra-short ultra-intense pulsed lasers with pulselengths in
20This corresponds to a consumption of 0.5 kg of tritium per day.
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the range of 10−15 to 10−12 s, i.e., femtoseconds to picoseconds,21 and beam in-
tensities on the order of 1020 W/cm2, i.e., sufficient to induce strong relativistic,
multi-photon, nonlinear, and direct nuclear effects [32, 33, 34, 35].22 Their inven-
tion ended a twenty years long period over which laser intensity plateaued at a
maximum of about 1014 W/cm2.
The potential military applications of superlasers are so impressive that their
principles have been implemented on existing large laser systems built for inertial
confinement fusion and weapons simulation, pushing their peak power by three
orders of magnitude from 1 TW to 1 PW which is why superlasers are more
commonly called “petawatt lasers.” As can be seen in Table 3, there are now
superlasers in operation or under construction in all major industrial states.
Superlasers enable a two step approach to ICF similar to the “sparkplug” igni-
tion of a cold compressed fuel in H-bombs [36, 37]. The proposed “fast ignition”
scheme is as follows: first, a capsule is imploded as in the conventional approach
to inertial fusion to assemble a high-density fuel configuration; second, a hole is
bored by a superlaser through the capsule corona composed of ablated material;
finally, the fuel is ignited by fast electrons, produced in the superlaser-plasma
interactions, which then propagate to the center of the pellet. This new scheme en-
ables a factor of 10–100 reduction in total driver energy; it also drastically reduces
the difficulty of the implosion, and thereby allows lower quality target fabrication,
and less stringent beam quality and symmetry requirements from the implosion
driver [36, p.1626].
The whole subject of superlaser research and development is presently a do-
main of very intense activity. New institutes and specialized laboratories have been
created in several countries. For example, the Center for Ultrafast Optical Science
at the University of Michigan, the Max-Born-Institut für Nichtlineare Optik und
Kurzzeitspektroskopie (MBI) in Berlin, the Centre Etude Lasers Intenses et Appli-
cations (CELIA)in Bordeaux, or the Advanced Photon Research Center (APRC)
of the Japan Atomic Research Institute (JAERI) Kensai establishment. As shown
in Table 3, all the most advanced industrialized countries have now superlasers
with powers of at least 10 TW, and 100-1000 TW superlasers in operation or under
construction.
At present, with the closing and dismantling of the large American and French
lasers to allow for the construction of NIF and LMJ, the most powerful lasers and
superlasers in operation are in Japan and in England. Japan is in fact the current
21A femtosecond, i.e., 1 fs = 10−15 s is on the order of the time taken by an electron to circle an
atom. This gives the order of magnitude of the minimum pulselength of an optical laser pulse.
22They are called superlasers in this review because their interactions with matter are qualitatively
very different from those of ordinary lasers.
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world leader, and was able to announce on March 28, 2003, that APRC “succeeded
in the development of a compact laser system capable of generating the world’s
highest laser output power of 850 trillion watts (0.85 petawatts)” [38]. Contrary
to previous “proof of principle” petawatt-class superlasers which were quite large,
this compact superlaser is based on solid-state Ti:Sapphire amplifier technology.
Germany, however, is proceeding very fast and trying to catch up with the rest
of the world [39]. This is done in collaboration with the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, with which Germany has passed “agreements” which were
previously only available to England and France, two nuclear-weapon States [39].
In the the foreword of the GSI Scientific report 2002, one reads : "The highly
appreciated delivery of components from the NOVA laser from Livermore gave a
push to the PHELIX laser project (...) petawatt operation for end of 2004/beginning
of 2005" [40, p.ii].
Superlasers are an example of a breakthrough that is the result of pure tech-
nological innovation. It was known since many years that one day a way would
be found to go from the 1014 W/cm2 standard laser intensity to the 1020 W/cm2
range because there is no fundamental obstacle until the laser intensity limit of
1024 W/cm2 is approached.23
However, there are other technologies (some of which listed in Table 1) which
have also the potential of facilitating the ignition of an ICF pellets, and even to
be sufficiently compact to be able to turn an ICF pellet into a fourth generation
nuclear weapon. One such technology is antimatter [41, 42, 43], and several other
possibilities (e.g., nuclear isomers [44]) are discussed in reference [22].
2.5 Common proliferation implications of all fusion
energy systems
There are seven main common sources of proliferation associated with all types of
fusion energy systems: neutron abundance, tritium abundance, new technological
routes to uranium enrichment, latent thermonuclear weapon proliferation, induced
nuclear weapon proliferation, and links to emerging military technologies.
23In contrast, technologies such as thermonuclear fusion for electricity generation are already
at their scientific limit. No technological breakthrough is to be expected for them. This is why,
assuming that all the details are worked out, whatever confinement scheme is adopted, it is already
possible to compare these systems with other sources of electricity.
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2.5.1 Neutron abundance: Fusion-fission hybrids and pluto-
nium breeders
While fission produces about 200 MeV of energy and between two and three neu-
trons per split nuclei, whereas fusion of DT generates only 17.6 MeV of energy
and a single neutron per fused nuclei, the fission reaction is called “energy rich
– neutron poor” and the fusion reaction “neutron rich – energy poor”. There-
fore, fission is most appropriate for producing energy, and fusion for producing
neutrons.24
The consequence of this fundamental fact is that the most effective technique
for producing nuclear energy is to surround the reaction chamber of a fusion
reactor by a blanket in which the fusion neutrons produce additional neutrons
and breed plutonium, which is then burnt in ordinary fission reactors. This is the
concept of the “fusion-fission hybrid” [30], which takes advantage of the factor
200/17.6 ≈ 10 which favors fusion relative to fission as a supply of neutrons, and
fission relative to fusion as a source of energy.25
In the 1980s the main proliferation problem of these hybrids was felt to be the
consequences of their exceptional potential as plutonium breeders [45]. This was
because for a nominal power of 3000 MW (thermal) the best heavy-water fission
reactor would breed “only” 500 kg/Pu per year, while a hypothetical fusion-fission
hybrid of the same power would breed more than 5’000 kg/Pu per year.
Today, because of the existing surpluses of (both military and civilian) pluto-
nium and enriched uranium, the emphasis is different: a fusion hybrid is about
ten times more effective than a fission reactor to breed plutonium or tritium. In
particular, for a given material output, its production of heat, nuclear waste, and
traceable fission products such as 85Kr is at least ten times less than with a fission
reactor. This makes such a facility easier to hide from inspection.26 Moreover,
the sub-critical blanket of a hybrid reactor is more appropriate for plutonium
production than a critical fission reactor. With an appropriate design, continuous
extraction of plutonium is easy. Even for long neutron irradiation times in the blan-
ket, the quality of the plutonium produced in a fast hybrid blanket is better than
24This is why the most powerful nuclear weapons, i.e., those with the highest yield-to-weight
ratio, use a “third stage” in which the fusion neutrons from the second stage are used to fission a
uranium or plutonium blanket surrounding it.
25This factor of ten assumes that in a critical reactor one neutron is needed to maintain the chain
reaction, and that the fate of the another fission neutrons is similar to those from fusion once the
they are multiplied in a blanket.
26The only other systems which shows similar characteristics are the accelerator-breeders [45].
These hybrids are now promoted for the efficient production of tritium for military purposes (see
end of Sec.2.5.3).
35
that produced in a critical reactor [46]. A rather small facility, e.g., 10 MW(th)
of fusion power, producing plutonium and tritium in a mixed uranium/lithium
blanket, could be sufficient to maintain a minimal deterrent based on a few dozen
high quality boosted fission bombs.
Of course, one may object that any fusion facility would be big, expensive, and
very sophisticated. That is not necessarily the case. As will be seen in the section
on alternate fusion systems, some of them might be quite small and rudimentary.
Moreover, if an easy route to ICF is found, small scale ICF might become feasible.
One may also object that the DD fusion reaction, and even more so the
“aneutronic” fusion reactions such as 3HeD and 11Bp, will generate much less
neutrons. While this is true, it is also known since a long time, that “theDT reaction
is the only one which can be used exothermically by the magnetic confinement
method of the tokamak, as the other interesting reactions produce too high a loss
of energy by cyclotron radiation” [47, p.331]. The same is true for ICF: It is
unlikely that any fuel other than DT will enable the construction of economically
attractive fusion power plants. In conclusion, the DT fuel will always be the most
attractive, and it will be a serious proliferation threat that a hypothetical future
“aneutronic-fusion” reactor will switch to the DT fuel cycle to produce neutrons
for various illegitimate purposes.
2.5.2 Tritium abundance: Boosted-fission and pure-fusion
nuclear weapons
Whatever confinement-method used, a nominal 1 GW (electric) fusion power
plant with a thermal efficient of 30% would consume 10 mg of DT per second.
If we assume a tritium burn efficiency of 30% (either in slow multi-second pulses
as in MCF, or in fast pellet-explosions as in ICF), the amount of tritium to be
processed and fed into the reaction chamber every day is 1.7 kg. This tritium
has to be regenerated and the idea is to breed this tritium in a lithium-blanket
surrounding the reaction chamber.27 Assuming that at least one tritium atom is
bred for every neutron incident on the blanket, and that about one tenth of the
blanket is reprocessed every day to extract the tritium, a minimum of 5 kg of
tritium will be constantly held in the blanket.28 With a ten-day supply of tritium
bottled to allow for reasonable down times, the total inventory is about 17+5 = 22
kg.
These ≈ 20 kilograms of tritium in every nominal 1 GW fusion power plant
27The tritium breeding reaction is n + 6Li −→ T + 4He.
28This is ten times the daily consumption of 0.5 kg of tritium.
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have to be compared to the amount of tritium in a military inventory, which in the
case of the United States, is currently of about 100 kg. Since tritium has a half-life
of 12.3 years, about 5 kg of tritium has to be produced every year to maintain
this inventory. Hence, from a vertical proliferation point of view, a single 1 GW
fusion plant (which can easily breed more than the 0.5 kg of tritium needed every
day for its own consumption) is more than sufficient to satisfy the tritium needs
of a large nuclear arsenal, and even to envisage supplying a pure-fusion weapons
arsenal which may require a significantly larger tritium inventory.
From a horizontal proliferation point of view, there are two major problems:
• Whereas to make one crude fission weapon about 3–6 kg of plutonium have
to be diverted from a fission power-plant (i.e., about 1–2 % of its fissile
material inventory), to make a tritium-booster for one fission weapon only
2 g of tritium have to be diverted from a fusion power-plant (i.e., about
0.01 % of its tritium inventory). Considering the existing difficulties with
plutonium accounting, such a level of tritium control seems impossible to
achieve in practice.
• Future nuclear arsenals will most probably be based on some kind of pure-
fusion weapons. Such fourth generation nuclear weapons will require only
small amounts of tritium per warhead. Assuming a relatively poor tritium
burn-efficiency of 20 % in these weapons, every milligram of tritium would
be worth the equivalent of about 100 kilograms of TNT.29 Hence, assuming
a modest breeding ratio of 1.1, a single 1 GW fusion plant would be able
to supply 0.05 kg of tritium daily, enough to fabricate every day 5’000
warheads with a yield equivalent to 1 ton TNT each.
2.5.3 Dedicated nuclear weapons materials production facili-
ties
Priorities in the present fusion programs worldwide emphasize the development
of MCF systems for electricity production and ICF systems for nuclear weapons
simulation. However, there have been publications (e.g., [45, 48, 49]), and cer-
tainly a number of classified studies, suggesting that such systems could also be
used to breed large quantities of nuclear materials such as tritium and plutonium
for military purposes.
29We will come back later on the military value of highly compact weapons with yields in the
hundreds to a few thousands of kg TNT.
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In the nuclear-weapon States, the arguments put forward in favor of the con-
struction of such facilities are (1) the need to replace aging facilities30 and (2)
the increased importance of tritium relative to fissile materials in modern nuclear
weapons.31
As was emphasized in the two previous subsections, a fusion reactor can breed
up to ten times as much tritium or plutonium than a fission reactor of the same
power. Since disposal of heat is a major cost driver in any type of nuclear reactor,
a major advantage of fusion-based systems is that they will produce much less heat
for a given nuclear material output. This advantage becomes particularly important
if a fusion machine is specifically designed to maximize neutron production for
nuclear material breeding instead of heat production for electricity generation. This
kind of optimization requires the development of a neutron multiplying blanket
that poses fewers technical issues than a blanket for electric power generation.32
One approach, which minimizes heat production in the blanket, is to multiply
neutrons by the (n, 2n) reaction in beryllium embedded in the blanket.33 In this
way, the blanket can be designed to breed 1.6 useful neutrons per fusion reaction.
These neutrons can breed 1.6 tritons, and hence, an excess of 0.6 triton per fusion
reaction for a total energy release of about 25 MeV (see Table 5). As is shown in
this table, fission can also yield a net 0.6 triton per fission reaction, but with an
energy release of 200 MeV. Therefore, fusion produces eight times less heat than
fission relatively to breeding capacity.
In small MCF tritium breeders this large cost advantage may be offset by the
cost of plasma technology (magnets, vacuum, etc.) required to confine the plasma.
However, since plasma technology costs do not scale directly with fusion power,
the capital cost of a magnetic confinement fusion breeder is relatively insensitive
to thermal power and breeding capacity over a wide range [48, Sec.2]. This
leads proponents of this technology to conclude that “because the fusion driver
30In the U.S.A, for example, tritium was produced only at the Savannah River complex. The
reactors at Savannah River are now over 50 years old and will most probably never be restarted.
31
“The nation will have a continued need for an assured supply of tritium as long as nuclear
weapons exits. [...] Moreover, certain changes in the makeup of the stockpile, underway or being
considered, could actually increase the need for tritium even if the number of weapons declines.
Steps toward ‘modernization’ of weapons, such as ‘safer’ high explosives, or new missions calling
for tailored effects, may lead to weapons with substantially higher than typical amounts of tritium.
Long-range nuclear materials planning requires assuring plutonium production as well” [48, p.2].
32This is also the case for the design of the blanket of an experimental fusion reactor such as
ITER: In a research facility heat is an unwanted byproduct of fusion complicating the design of
the reactor and interfering with experiments such as the study of tritium breeding or of the effects
of neutrons on structural materials.
33This concept is included in most ITER blanket designs, for instance the Japanese mass-
production technology for ceramic tritium breeder pebbles under development at JAERI [13].
38
for a nuclear materials production facility would be smaller than a fusion power
reactor, the present status of magnetic fusion research is, relatively speaking, more
advanced for the purpose of breeding tritium than for energy applications [48,
p.6].”34
Similar arguments are used by proponents of inertial confinement fusion who
stress that “defense money will be unavailable [for a future ICF machine] unless
it has a specific defense function such as tritium production or the destruction of
plutonium” [49].
In fact, while eventual future fusion reactors will pose a serious proliferation
problem because of the possibility to divert tritium towards military ends, the
declared nuclear powers will always prefer to rely on dedicated facilities to satisfy
their military needs. In this case, the main competition to fusion for supplying
tritium in the future comes from accelerator based systems, which in addition
to many advantages similar to those of fusion, have the interest to be a feasible
extrapolation of existing proven technology. In the event that such accelerator
breeders are built in the near term, e.g., in the U.S. [50, 51] or France [52, 53],
or possibly Japan [54, 55] or South Korea [56], fusion will remain an attractive
option for a more distant future.
2.5.4 New or renewed enrichment technologies
Natural uranium is a quite widely available commodity. However, to make a
fission-explosive, the difficulty is that natural uranium must either be burnt (e.g., in
a heavy water reactor) to produce plutonium, or enriched to separate the fissile 235U
fraction from the more abundant non-fissile 238U component. Many technologies
are available for uranium enrichment and some of the most efficient ones make
use of lasers of various kinds.
While the large high-energy lasers used as drivers for ICF are not directly
applicable to laser-enrichment, the underlying technology is the same. Moreover,
superlasers may open new proliferation paths to laser-enrichment because they
can be used to pump isomeric nuclear states for gamma-ray lasers, energy storage,
and new military explosives [44]. When used to excite the first isomeric state of
235U , superlasers may lead to a very effective and compact technique for 100%
uranium enrichment in one stage [57].
Concerning other enrichment technologies, the ones that are based on separa-
34This means that the blanket design for an experimental reactor such as ITER is better suited
for breeding tritium than for producing energy.
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tion in an electromagnetic field, i.e., the “calutron” method [58] and the “plasma
separation” process, are the ones that will most directly benefit from the devel-
opment of high-current ion beams and superconducting magnets technologies for
ICF and MCF [45, 58, 59].
2.5.5 Latent thermonuclear proliferation
Thermonuclear fusion is being promoted by the nuclear-weapon States as a po-
tential source of energy and therefore a legitimate subject of study in non-nuclear-
weapon States. This leads to a growing situation of latent thermonuclear prolifer-
ation that will be examined in section 2.9.
2.5.6 Induced nuclear proliferation
Since thermonuclear fusion research and development creates the scientific and
technical basis for actual or latent thermonuclear weapons proliferation, in ei-
ther nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon States, it is legitimate for the less advanced
countries to be concerned by this situation. This may induce them to acquire the
knowledge and skills for making first-generation nuclear weapons, which in turn
become a justifications for the nuclear-weapon States to produce more advanced
and usable nuclear weapons to effectively deter or counter this type of proliferation,
and so on...
2.5.7 Links to emerging military technologies
As was already explained in section 2.3, all technologies relevant to thermonuclear
energy have important military applications in nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.
Lasers, accelerators, superconductive devices, etc., are key components of new
kinds of non-nuclear weapons: Laser and particle beam-weapons, electromagnetic
guns, etc.
A clear example of the ambivalence of thermonuclear research with high-
energy lasers is the project to use the technology developed for the U.S. National
Ignition Facility (NIF) to build an Earth-based laser to clear near-Earth space
debris [60, p.15]: Such a device would also be an effective anti-satellite weapon.
Several other example will be cited in the following sections.
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2.6 Specific proliferation implications of inertial confine-
ment fusion (ICF)
The most direct proliferation contributions of ICF are obviously in the domains
of thermonuclear weapons’s physics and effects. These implications have been
expounded in a number of publications (see, e.g., [45, 22] and references therein).
Since the nuclear-weapon States are not shy at recognizing that ICF is essential
to their nuclear deterrent, it is interesting to compare the headlines of two formal
assessments of the relevance of ICF to the nuclear weapons program of the United
States:
First, in 1977, fourteen years after the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty
(PTBT), the main nuclear weapons’s applications of ICF were presented as follows
[61, Chart 6]:
• Provides support for underground tests
• Potential for large-scale weapon effects simulation
• Allows modeling of atmospheric nuclear explosions
• Provides unique capability for modeling of nuclear weapons physics
including:
1. Normalization of design codes
2. Studies of implosion physics
3. Measurements of critical materials properties
Second, in 1997, one year after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test ban
Treaty (CTBT), in a review of the ICF program, the section about the “relevance
of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) to Science Based Stockpile Stewardship
(SBSS)” is highlighting the following items [62]:
• People
• Certification of the weapons stewards
• Code validation and materials properties
• Ignition:
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1. The study of burn in the presence of mix
2. The diagnosis of ICF plasma
3. High-energy-density phenomena
4. Proof-of-principle for inertial fusion energy (IFE)
Therefore, in both evaluations, the main emphasis is on showing how ICF is
compensating for the perceived losses due to a major arms-control agreement, and
the second on underlining the potential benefits of ICF for the future of nuclear
weapons development.
In 1977, ICF was at its beginning. It was important to show that it would be a
powerful substitute for atmospheric tests and an effective simulator for weapons
effects studies. This substitution has progressively been done over the past twenty
years (with the help of ICF and a number of pulsed-power technologies) and will
be complete when large ICF facilities such as NIF will yield the very intense bursts
of neutrons that only underground nuclear explosions could provide.35
In 1997, SBSS is at its beginning. The age of building and testing multi-kiloton
to multi-megaton hydrogen bombs is gone, and a new generation of people is
needed: People to take care of the existing arsenal without underground tests, and
people to design and possibly build the next generation of nuclear weapons using
computer simulations and laboratory tests. Before coming to the implications of
ICF for this fourth generation of nuclear weapons, let us review the more trivial
military applications of ICF:
2.6.1 Nuclear weapon-effects research
ICF systems enable both nuclear and non-nuclear effects to be studied. The latter
consists of the effects of low and high altitude single and multiburst detonation in
the atmosphere. Such studies enable (a) prediction of the effects of subsequent
bursts in a multiburst environment; (b) evaluation of the spatial extent and duration
of satellite communication interference; and (c) evaluation of radar shielding
effects which hinder detection of secondary missions [63]. Since 1964, because
of the PTBT, such problems cannot be studied with real nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere.
35In the meantime, the most intense neutron simulators have been accelerator-based systems
such as the LANSCE at Los Alamos, where the weapons neutron research (WNR) facility uses a
spallation neutron sources driven by a storage ring to reach instantaneous fluxes of 1022 n/cm2/s
[45].
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The total radiation field of a nuclear explosion is composed of x-ray, gamma-
ray, neutron and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) components. The intensity of
each of these is strongly dependent upon the specific design and the yield of
the weapon. Also, the presence or absence of some of these radiations depend
on the environment in which the nuclear detonation occurs. For example, in an
underground explosion some of the radiation (e.g., EMP) will be absent compared
to an atmospheric or high altitude explosion [63].
Until the conclusion of the CTBT, synergistic testing was done through un-
derground explosions, but ICF provides now an alternative method for carrying
out such tests in the laboratory; an ICF exposure is expected to cost less than one
percent of an underground experiment.36 Furthermore, experiments with an ICF
facility are much more convenient and reproducible. For example, meter-sized
costly equipments such as reentry vehicles, missiles, satellites, can be exposed to
neutron fluxes of 1013 to 1014 n/cm2/s, or 3 to 30 cal/cm2 x-rays, without com-
pletely destroying them. ICF systems can also be used for “nuclear hardening,”
and to “burn in” ready-to-field equipments by exposing them to radiations and
replacing the weakest components that may have failed.
2.6.2 Nuclear weapons-physics research
After the discovery of the Teller-Ulam principle, and some major improvements
during the 1960s, progress on thermonuclear weapons slowed down dramatically.
In fact, despite more than 50 years of research and development, and after almost
two thousand test explosions, the scientific understanding of the details of the sec-
ondary system is still incomplete.37 If the CTBT would not have been concluded,
the continuation of full-scale testing would probably never have changed this sit-
uation, given the great number of complex phenomena that occur simultaneously
within the fraction of a microsecond of the explosion of an H-bomb.
A major problem with full-scale testing is that the secondary of an actual bomb
is buried deep inside the weapon, surrounded by a thick ablator and the radiation
case. Therefore, most experimental data on the thermonuclear part of the explosion
is indirect. In comparison, an ICF pellet is an almost naked secondary, and many
configurations can be tested at will, with much better diagnostic capabilities than
36However, for countries such as India, because of the complexity and huge investment cost of
large ICF facilities, underground tests are potentially less expensive than ICF simulations.
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“We do not completely understand the physical processes involved in the operation of a nuclear
weapon” [64, p.24]. “We do not understand nuclear weapon processes well enough to calculate
precisely the transfer of energy within a weapon” [64, p.30]. For a more detailed development of
the subject of this subsection see, in particular, [22, Chap.3].
43
with underground nuclear tests. The promise of ICF is a complete description of
thermonuclear weapons physics from first principles.
Laser and particle beams are capable of concentrating large amounts of energy
onto small targets. These targets may consist of non-nuclear materials, fissile
materials, or fusion materials. The very high pressures and shock strengths possi-
ble with the kind of beams necessary to drive ICF systems, enable hydrodynamic
behavior and material equations of state to be studied in a parameter range com-
parable to that existing within exploding nuclear weapons (see Fig.6). The large
megajoule-scale ICF facilities currently under construction (e.g., NIF, LMJ, see
Table 3) will be particularly well suited for this purpose [65], as well as smaller
facilities such as Helen in the United Kingdom [66].
But proton beams from high-power generators, such as, for example, the
Karlsruhe Light Ion Beam Facility (KALIF) (see Table 4) in Germany enable
similar measurement with power densities of up to 200 TW/g and energies densities
of several MJ/g [67]. As can be seen on Fig.6, such energies densities, equivalent
to 2 × 10−4 kt/kg, are only a factor of 100 less than NIF without ignition. Other
pulsed-power beam generators, such as the Saturn electron accelerator [68] in the
U.S.A., are also providing important nuclear weapons data, even though they are
primarily advocated as fusion energy research tools.38 This is also case of PBFA
(or “Z Machine”) at Sandia National Laboratory (see Table 4) which in 2003 was
able to produce a significant amount of DD fusion neutrons that could previously
only be generated with laser beam facilities [69].
Moreover, lower-energy kilojoule-scale laser facilities equipped with a super-
laser for fast ignition — such as the 60 beams 50 kilojoule Japanese laser FIREX-II
(see Table 3)39 combined with a 4 beams 10 kilojoule petawatt superlaser — are
also expected to achieve ignition, and therefore to enable thermonuclear burn
studies comparable to those feasible with NIF or LMJ (see Fig.6).
The complexity of ICF target experiments requires that they be analysed by
simulating the experiment with two- and three-dimensional hydrocodes. Thus
verification and improvement of weapon design code is an intrinsic part of ICF
experiments. Since ICF research is done in non-nuclear-weapon States, very
sophisticated computer codes have been developed and published by scientists
in such States. For instance, the two-dimensional hydrocode MULTI2D [70]
38Laser facilities, however, provide a much “cleaner” working environment, especially with
respect to electromagnetic interferences from the pulsed-power equipment, and much better energy
deposition profiles because of the greater flexibility of time-shaping the laser pulses.
39FIREX stands for “Fast Ignition Realization Experiment. For a description and planning
of the FIREX project, see the Annual progress reports 2001 and 2002 of the Institute of Laser
Engineering, Osaka University.
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developed at the Max-Planck-Institut für Quantenoptik, in Garching, Germany, is
considered to be in several respects better and faster than LASNEX, the currently
standard (and partially classified) U.S. two-dimensional hydrocode. These codes
allow, in particular, the simulation of the dynamics and stability of implosion (of
either passive or nuclear materials) driven by x-rays, high-energy beams, or other
types of drivers: Chemical high-explosives, magnetic fields, electromagnetic guns,
etc.
Considerable scientific data necessary for the design of fusion systems is also
crucial for thermonuclear weapons. For example, the temperature- and pressure-
dependent opacity functions for high atomic-number elements were classified until
1993 because this information is needed to make such weapons. Techniques for
measuring these opacities are improving because of the availability of high-energy
lasers. These can be used to measure opacities directly at laser frequencies, or
indirectly by converting the laser radiation to x-radiation, and measuring opacities
in the x-ray region which is the most relevant to nuclear weapons.
A last aspect of ICF which is of importance in weapons physics is that of
rate-dependent processes. An ICF system can easily expose a recoverable target
to neutron and x-ray fluxes comparable to those of a full size nuclear explosion.
2.6.3 Ignition: Fourth generation nuclear weapons and inertial
fusion energy (IFE)
“Ignition,” the last item stressed in the 1997 assessment of ICF, refers to the
fact that macroscopic processes like thermonuclear plasma ignition are still not
well understood. Special ICF targets which absorb the driver energy and convert
it to x-rays enable H-bomb ignition physics to be studied directly. Moreover,
ignition techniques different from the Teller-Ulam concept can also be studied, or
discovered, using ICF. “Fast ignition” using a superlaser, or the replacement of
the “sparkplug” by a minute amount of antimatter [42], are examples of such new
concepts.
The important conclusion is that, whatever the details, successful ignition of
thermonuclear micro-explosions in the laboratory will open the way to two types
of applications which will most certainly remain in the military domain, i.e., new
types of nuclear weapons, and inertial fusion energy (IFE):
• Fourth generation nuclear weapons. Inertial confinement fusion is basically
a continuous salvo of contained thermonuclear explosions. In a nominal
1 GW fusion power plant, the yield of these explosions will be equivalent
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to about 100 or 1000 kg of TNT, assuming a rate of 10 or 1 detonations per
second, or else to about 10 tons of TNT, assuming a rate of one detonation
every 10 seconds. The military significance of these yields derives from the
fact that the amount of conventional high-explosives (HE) carried by typical
warheads or bombs is limited to a range of a few 100 kg to a few tons.40
Since an ICF pellet weighs only a fraction of a gram, ICF based military
explosives would revolutionize warfare. Combined with precision guidance,
earth and concrete penetration, and other existing techniques, small and
lightweight ICF based warheads would destroy virtually all possible targets,
and render existing types of high-yield nuclear weapons obsolete. The
challenge, of course, is to replace the large laser- or particle-beam driver by
some sufficiently miniaturized device. This problem will not be discussed
here.41 However, it will be recalled that a single-use device is usually
much more compact and simple than a multi-purpose re-usable experimental
facility, and that very-high energy-density technologies such as antimatter
and superlasers are ripe to meet the challenge [22].42 In particular, in a
review of the use of antiprotons as a compact ICF driver [42] it has been
found that the number of antiprotons required for the fast ignition of ICF
pellets is several orders of magnitude smaller than was estimated by the
authors of the present review ten years earlier [41].
• Inertial fusion energy. Success with ignition, and a sufficient reduction of
scale of the driver, would provide a very attractive substitute for the numerous
nuclear reactors used by the military.43 As for the possible civilian use of
IFE, the prospect is bleak. Considering the bad image that nuclear energy
has in general, it is unlikely that IFE will be found acceptable by the public
in democratic countries. For one thing, development of IFE will come in
parallel with fourth generation nuclear weapons which will use ICF pellets
as their main explosive charge. A daily load of ICF pellets for a medium
or full scale fusion power plant will consist of thousands of pellets, each of
them equivalent to one or several tons of high explosives. If these pellets
are not fabricated at the power plant, their shipment will have to be heavily
guarded. Moreover, because fusion pellets contain only weakly radioactive
40The Scud ballistic missile warhead contains roughly 200 kg of HE and the Patriot anti-
missile warhead roughly 40 kg. A Tomahawk long-range cruise-missile carries a conventional
or thermonuclear warhead weighting about 120 kg, and a typical big air-dropped bomb weighs
between 500 and 2000 kg.
41For a development of this question see [22, Chap.4].
42These considerations about radically new types of nuclear weapons should not minimize the
potential of using ICF facilities for improving existing types of nuclear weapons [71].
43There are in the world more military nuclear reactors at sea, under the sea, and in various
military facilities, than nuclear power reactors producing electricity for civilian purposes.
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materials, e.g., tritium, diversion will be difficult to detect.
2.6.4 People
As Ted Taylor44 likes to say: “The most important things to make a bomb are
dedicated people and a good library.” This is made clear by the emphasis put on
“people” and “weapons stewards” by the U.S. National Academy of Science in
their 1997 assessment of the relevance of ICF to SBSS [62]. The trouble is that
this is also true for the non-nuclear-weapon States. World-wide thermonuclear
energy research is creating a basis which allows the much more rapid development
of quite advanced thermonuclear weapons than would otherwise be possible.
2.7 Specific proliferation implications of magnetic
confinement fusion (MCF)
Much of what has been said about ICF in the previous section applies to MCF, with
the obvious differences which derive from the fact that the operation of a MCF
device is characterized by a much smaller plasma density (and a correspondly
much longer burn time) than in an ICF device or a thermonuclear explosion. For
this reason, MCF physics and technology is less closely related to thermonuclear
weapons than is the case for ICF. However, there are several areas in which MCF is
providing specific direct or indirect contributions to nuclear weapons proliferation.
Let us briefly mention two of them:
2.7.1 Nuclear weapons effects
Tokamak test reactors have been proposed for nuclear weapon-effects research
[72]. The main advantage is the very large volume with uniform irradiation flux
of 1013 n/cm2/s offered. However, because of the very long pulselength compared
with ICF, tokamak test reactors are best suited for determining the permanent
damage due to neutron (and x-ray) radiation to total-dose-dependent rather than
dose-rate-dependent devices and subsystems. In 1982, it was hoped that the
Princeton tokamak fusion test reactor could be used to help define an optimized
tokamak radiation effects facility that could have been implemented by the early
1990s in a suitable location [72].
44To whom we dedicated our report on fourth generation nuclear weapons [22].
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2.7.2 Military spin-offs of MCF technology
In a compilation of several surveys, it was found that the most numerous technology
transfers from magnetic fusion research to other areas of science and technology
were in the domains of magnet technology, power supplies, materials technology,
particle beams, power supplies and vacuum technology [73]. These types of
spin-offs are similar to those found for high-energy particle accelerator physics
research, a domain which like MCF produces relatively few spin-offs of direct
importance to industrial development.
Superconductive magnet are of great importance for strategic military devel-
opments in outer space and ballistic missile defense, as well as for tactical de-
velopments such as electromagnetic-pulse generators and electromagnetic guns.
The use of cryogenic and superconductive magnets in space is been investigated
for pulsed-power generation, power conditioning and energy storage, and was
expected to play a major role in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program
[74].
Superconductive magnets are also of great interest for the “plasma separation
process” [59] which is potentially the most attractive technique for very-high
throughput isotope separation [75, 76]. Large scale isotope enrichment is important
for the production of 235U as well as for the enrichment of various types of medium
weight nuclear species if “isotopic tailoring” becomes an important feature of new
materials. Such materials are expected to be necessary for making the first wall of
MCF fusion vessels (in order to minimize their erosion and radioactivation due to
the intense neutron bombardment from the burning plasma) as well for a number
of military applications where similar or related properties are important.
2.7.3 Examples of spin-off technologies expected from ITER
To conclude this section, we quote in extenso the examples given in section 5.13
devoted to the spin-off benefits of fusion technologies in the summary of the report
of the Special Committee on the ITER Project of the Japanese Atomic Energy
Commission. This is not to imply that the examples given by the Committee are
necessarily relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but an illustration that
they are indeed mostly dual-purpose technologies of great military significance:
“Driving force of spin-off technologies
Since fusion development requires gathering knowledge from a myr-
iad of advanced technologies, it is now making significant progress as
48
a seed of these technologies. The fusion device is based on diverse
research fields and fashioned from advanced technologies, such as
physics, mechanical engineering, electric and electronic engineering,
materials engineering, thermodynamics, heat transfer flow and ther-
mal engineering, nuclear engineering, cryogenic engineering, electro-
magnetic dynamics, chemical engineering, and control engineering
and instrumentation. Therefore, the development of this compound
technology not only advances individual fusion technology but also
raises the potential capability of all science and technology by mutual
stimulation between different fields of science. The resultant spin-off
benefits are seen in commercial technologies, such as the semicon-
ductor industry and the large, precision machine-tool industry. Fusion
research also contributes to the development of advanced technology
and basic science of other fields, such as physics, space science, mate-
rials science, medicine, communications, and environmental science.
These applied sciences include accelerator technology, superconduc-
tor technology, diagnosing techniques, plasma application technology,
heatproof and heavy-irradiation-proof materials technology, impurity
removal techniques, and computer simulation techniques.
Examples of spin-off technologies
Examples of spin-off technologies include the development of large
superconducting coils for ITER, which reduced the cost by 75% of
niobium/tin superconducting wire material necessary of the genera-
tion of the high-magnetic fields. This has allowed the high-magnetic
field MRI used for medical diagnostics to become relatively common-
place. At the same time, the AC loss has been reduced by 80% of
that for conventional superconductors, even at the strong magnetic
field of 13 tesla. This makes it feasible to increase the stored energy
in a superconducting power storage system by a factor of 5–7 when
compared with a system designed with conventional technology and
operating at 5–6 tesla. In addition, vacuum pumps for high thermal
efficiency refrigerating machines, which operate below 4 K, have been
developed and have been adopted at the Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory in the US and CERN in Europe. This also demonstrates
the enormous contribution of fusion research to the frontiers of sci-
ence. The technology of producing large positive-ion-beam currents,
originally developed for the heating of fusion plasmas, has already
pervaded into the technologies for products used in daily life, such
the semiconductors used in the home electric appliances. In addition,
the large negative-ion-beam current technology developed for ITER
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is expected to give birth to completely new research fields, such as the
creation of previously unknown materials. The negative-ion beam,
which has monochromatic energy, is also suitable for manufacture of
intricate semiconductor devices. This allows the realization of low-
cost, mass-produced single crystal silicon thin films for solar cells.
Furthermore, high-power radio-frequency sources used for plasma
heating are already applied to the manufacture of high-performance
ceramics. Potential applications of these sources extend from solving
environmental problems to the radar used in outer space. The integra-
tion of component technology for the fusion reactor also advances the
systematic development of technologies addressing integration, such
as system engineering, control engineering, and safety engineering.
Additionally, an exploratory investigation related to the processing
of radioactive waste by utilizing a fusion reactor itself as an intense
neutron source is also being carried out and seems promising” [6,
p.274-275].
2.8 Proliferation implications of alternative fusion
systems (AFS)
Besides the two main contemporary contenders to fusion power, i.e., MCF and ICF,
a number of more or less attractive alternative schemes have been proposed: pinch
devices, magnetized fuels and magnetic compression devices, chemical explosive
driven systems, plasma focus, impact fusion, etc.
Like MCF and ICF, these concepts have generally been first studied at nuclear
weapons laboratories because it was important to carefully evaluate their military
potential before letting the scientific community at large working on them.
A particularly interesting example from the point of view of horizontal ther-
monuclear weapons proliferation is the so-called plasma focus which has been
independently discovered in Russia in 1962 and the United States in 1964.45 Es-
sentially, this is a fast dynamic Z-pinch in which the stored magnetic energy is
rapidly converted into plasma energy and then compressed by its own magnetic
field. It consists of two cylindrical electrodes between which a powerful electric
45The dense plasma focus is also known under the name of “Mather gun”, from the name of its
American inventor, Joseph W. Mather, who recently passed away. In his obituary [77], the DD
neutron yield of the most powerful DPF device known to have been built is mistyped 1012 instead
of 1018.
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discharge is initiated with a capacitor bank in a DD or DT atmosphere, and is
therefore the simplest high-flux fusion neutrons and x-rays generator that exists
[45, p.172].
In the United States, plasma focus development culminated in 1974 with a
device called “DPF 6 1/2” which produced ≈ 1020 DT -fusion neutrons at a
repetition rate of about four pulses per hour. If such discharges could be generated
at a higher rate and over long periods of time, a hybrid system could be built,
producing tens of kilograms of plutonium (or hundreds of grams of tritium) per
year [78, 79]. While this possibility seems to be relatively remote at present, and
will almost certainly never be cost effective, it should not be excluded as a simple
path to a nuclear weapon capability, similar in kind to the “calutron” enrichment
route taken by Iraq in the 1980s.
Because of its simple construction, and its richness in plasma physics phe-
nomena, dense plasma focus devices have been constructed in many advanced
(e.g., [80]) and developing countries. Looking at the recent literature, the latter
include, for example, India [81], Egypt [82], Malaysia [83], etc. The construction
and the operation of these devices, as well as the analysis of the data provided by
them, allow to train physicists specializing in experimental or theoretical plasma
physics, and give the possibility to travel abroad to actively participate in interna-
tional conferences. They may also provide some indigenous expertise in a number
of technical aspects connected with the physics of simple thermonuclear weapons,
including deuterium and tritium handling technology.
2.9 (De)classification and latent proliferation
History of the past 50 years shows that most scientific and technical knowledge
pertinent to nuclear or thermonuclear weapons and reactors has been kept secret as
long as possible by all countries which had a lead in these areas. Similarly, history
shows that many (and possibly all) other countries were interested by nuclear and
thermonuclear energy primarily because of their military applications, and only
secondarily because of their potential applications as sources of energy.
The process of declassification of information by the nuclear-weapon States is
therefore guided by political considerations in which military and foreign policy
reasons play the most important role. For example, as is shown by the analysis
of President Eisenhower “Atoms for Peace” initiative of 1953, and of the Western
Europe reaction to it, the atoms-for-peace policy of the United States was a foreign
policy concept — neither an energy policy nor a trade or economic policy [84, 85].
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Its main rationale was to demonstrate ‘world leadership’ in order to bind neutral
or politically indifferent countries to the West. As a reaction to this sensational
turn in Washington’s nuclear attitude, Moscow began shortly thereafter to join
the proliferation of basic nuclear know-how and equipment — although only
within its own hemisphere, for instance China and Eastern Europe. Consequently,
most countries with sufficient resources launched a nuclear power development
program which gave them a politically correct justification to achieve a latent
nuclear weapon capability, which could become an actual capability if needed at
some point.
In the area of thermonuclear fusion, the secrecy that had been imposed on its
development was lifted in the mid-1950s when an outstanding Russian scientists,
I.V. Kurchatov, presented in England results obtained in the Soviet Union with
the magnetic pinch device. This led the United Kingdom to declassify part of
its controlled thermonuclear fusion research with the publication, in 1957, of a
series of six articles in the Proceedings of the Physical Society comprising the
fundamental paper of J.D. Lawson defining the “Lawson criterion” for break-
even in thermonuclear fusion [86]. This in turn helped to persuade the American
authorities to declassify the whole magnetic confinement approach to fusion. At
the second Atoms for Peace Conference in 1958, a complete disclosure was made
by the United States and was fully reciprocated by the Russians.
This sequence of events illustrates that the Soviets decided to use their lead-
ership in MCF research as part of their answer to Eisenhower’s atoms-for-peace
initiative. They did that because they felt that while their “tokamak” device was
far better than anything in the West, forcing declassification in that area would not
reduce their advance in the field.
From then on, more and more information was declassified, mostly following
the publication of a growing number of sensitive results in the scientific and
technical literature by an increasing number of researchers from all over the
world. While possibly many of these results have been published because of non-
existent or ineffective classification policies in some countries, most of them have
been deliberately published (or not classified) for various reasons. In particular,
many significant research results have been published by scientists simply in
order for them or their country to get credit for being the first to have discovered
something. Similarly, as an element of their deterrence policy, threshold nuclear
States (especially India and Israel) and latent nuclear powers46 tend to display their
46In the late 1970s and early 1980s Swiss scientists published some of the most detailed simula-
tions of the dynamics of fission explosions that have ever been published. This was at a time when
Switzerland was still “defending” its status of a threshold nuclear-weapon State [87, p.70]. Later,
in 1985, the German Ministry of defense approached the Swiss government to obtain copies of
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level of understanding of the physics of nuclear weapons by publishing results that
have not already been published by others.
In the last twenty years, however, the main push towards the declassification
of thermonuclear weapons physics has come from the scientists of the two major
non-nuclear-weapon industrial powers: Japan and Germany. Japan, in particular,
has been so vigorously pursuing its very ambitious ICF program that it has found
itself in the position of the world leader at several occasions. In 1986, for example,
a thermonuclear neutron yield of 1012 was achieved with the Gekko XII laser —
a record that the U.S. and French nuclear scientists took several years to surpass.
Today, Japan is still leading the world with a pellet compression of 600 times its
initial solid density, a record achieved in 1989–90. Similarly, in 1998, Germany
has been the first country in the world to publish unambiguous results showing
that thermonuclear reactions can be induced by a table-top size superlaser [88],
something that military laboratories in nuclear-weapon States had most probably
already done before, but not published for obvious reasons. Further progress in that
direction was than made by Japan, which was first to report in 2002 a considerable
neutron yield enhancement with fast heating a compressed ICF pellet by means of
a petawatt superlaser beam [89].
On the theoretical side, where both Japan and Germany are publishing ev-
erything, important results have been disclosed starting around 1982, when Jür-
gen Meyer-ter-Vehn published his now famous energy gain model of fusion tar-
gets [90]. For instance, many detailed analytical and numerical simulations47 of
indirect-drive ICF, which use methods that are directly applicable to x-ray driven
thermonuclear weapons secondaries, have been published by Japanese and Ger-
man scientists, years before the corresponding calculations had been declassified
in the United States or France.
Consequently, when the United States Government decided in 1993 to de-
classify formerly secret material concerning the indirect-drive approach to ICF,
only a small part of what was declassified was really new to the open scientific
community. On the other hand, many European researchers in the field expected
that the U.S. Government declassification act of 1993 would increase the priority
given to ICF by their authorities. For example, in justifying its recommendation to
increase the European Union funding of ICF, a European Science and Technology
Assembly (ESTA) committee appointed in 1995 referred to this declassification
act as if the mere fact of declassifying something would remove its military po-
tential [91]. Since this recommendation was not followed by the European Union
several technical reports on nuclear and thermonuclear weapons that had been produced by Swiss
scientists [87, p.81-82].
47Using very advanced two-dimensional hydrodynamic simulation codes, e.g., [70].
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(possibly because of the opposition of France and the United Kingdom) some
scientists were led to qualify their governments as being “irresponsible” (see, e.g.,
[92]).
The problem is that latent thermonuclear proliferation, the fact that countries
such as Germany and Japan are able to build thermonuclear weapons on short
notice, and even to eventually equip themselves directly with fourth generation
nuclear weapons, bypassing the acquisition of previous generations of nuclear
weapons, is not a trivial situation at all. In particular, it is not the result of any
recent short-term political decision. It is neither something that can be changed
by trivial political action.
Latent thermonuclear proliferation is the result of political decision made in
the 1940s and 1950s which gave to (thermo)-nuclear science and (thermo)-nuclear
energy the privileged status they still have today. Because advanced thermonu-
clear research is now part of the normal scientific activity of all large industrial
countries, their emergence as latent thermonuclear powers was unavoidable. In
other words, latent thermonuclear proliferation and the possibility of fourth gen-
eration nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States is the result of a political
and technological dynamics which is today to a large extent out of the control of
both the scientific and political communities. In particular, this dynamics has in-
stitutionalized thermonuclear energy research in such a way that it is very difficult
to stop it, even though it is more and more overlapping with the most advanced
thermonuclear weapons related research done in the nuclear-weapon States.
An aggravating circumstance is the increasing reliance on virtual capabilities
by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. This is the direct conse-
quence of the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon States to give up their nuclear
weapons, and of their decision to replace actual tests by “simulation” and “science
based stockpile stewardship” programs. Instead of having unambiguously kept or
rejected the nuclear option, the nuclear-weapons-states are therefore lead to foster
“visible technical deterrence.” In the words of the director of the nuclear weapons
technology program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory:
“As I see it, at the end of the Cold War the nuclear weapons laboratories
took a new mission. Not only must we maintain the stockpile, but we
must do so in a manner visible to the world, a manner that demonstrates
our technical competence in scientific and engineering fields that are
obviously related to nuclear weapons” [20, p.2].
This is precisely what Japan and Germany (and to a lesser extent some smaller
countries such as South Korea) are also able to do without having to spend
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any resource on the maintenance of an expensive stockpile of high-yield nuclear
weapons, which is why the continuing expansion of their thermonuclear research
programs, and specific issues such as the possible siting of ITER in Japan, have
such important political and strategic implications.
2.10 Conclusions
In this review, we attempted a systematical analysis of the actual and latent nuclear
weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear energy systems.
The first conclusion is that the main findings confirm those of earlier reviews
of the subject (e.g., [45]). For instance, the development of thermonuclear energy
systems (especially those based on ICF) enhances the knowledge of thermonu-
clear weapon physics, provides an impetus for the development of a number of
technologies which have mostly military applications, and leads to new methods
for producing large quantities of military useful nuclear fuels such as tritium.
The second conclusion is that the successful development of any kind of ther-
monuclear fusion power plant would pose very serious nonproliferation problems
because very large amounts of tritium (which are on the order of kilograms per
day) would be produced in these plants. Moreover, if the plants would be based on
inertial confinement fusion, operation would require the detonation of many thou-
sands of “micro hydrogen bombs” every day, each of them with a yield measured
in tons equivalent of high explosives. Similarly to tritium, these pellets would have
to be safeguarded because they could possibly be used as very compact military
explosives which would revolutionize conventional and nuclear warfare.
The third conclusion is that the widespread availability of supercomputers, and
numerous scientific/technical advances such as the discovery of the superlaser,
tend to decrease the scientific and technological gap between the nuclear-weapon
and non-nuclear-weapon States. The result is that thermonuclear energy research
enhances the competence of the most advanced non-nuclear-weapon States to the
point where their status of latent thermonuclear powers becomes more and more
equivalent to one of actual thermonuclear powers.
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Chapter 4
Appendix: ITER siting politics
Excerpt from a commentary on version 2 of this report by
Clifford E. Singer
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
ITER siting is a matter I have been interested in for over 20 years. The overall
impact on siting in Japan depends heavily on two questions:
1. If ITER is not sited at Rokkasho, can it be built at all?
2. If ITER is sited at Rokkasho, will this be in addition to or as a substitute for
operation of the spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant there?
4.1 If ITER is not sited at Rokkasho, can it be built
at all?
Even though the decision to build ITER has nominally been made, it would not
be surprising to see the needed financial commitments partly or completely fail
to materialize if it is sited in France. Compared to Rokkasho, choice of a French
site could substantially reduce Japanese enthusiasm for the project and perhaps
also that of the United States as well. A Canadian site is also problematic due
to potential problems with Japanese and European funding, even though U.S.
scientists would find a Canadian site somewhat more convenient.
From an energy point of view a near-term decision to build ITER is unlikely to
be a cost-effective use of R&D investment with any plausible non-zero discount
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rate and likely future scenarios for evolution of the cost and use of alternative
energy technologies. However, from a basic science point of view tokamaks
provide a uniquely interesting research tool. Tokamaks are particularly useful for
studying transport in turbulent fluids, because turbulent transport is potentially
calculable over all of the relevant length scales — unlike for non-ionized gases
in macroscopic systems. However, it is more cost effective to research this in
much lower-cost tritium-free plasmas with careful attention to axisymmetry and
careful diagnostics of deviations from it due to neutral gas recycling. Thus, if a
Japanese site is chosen and is essential to actual construction of ITER, the effect
on magnetically confined plasma research may be deleterious unless there is such
a large overall funding increase that this precipitates a stronger research program
using other tokamaks not burdened with radioactivity management that results
from extensive high-power tritium operations.
In addition, a decision to abandon large-scale use of tritium in magnetic con-
finement research could gradually lead to a decoupling of the largely implicit
connection to military relevance in the minds of policy makers. On the other hand,
if ITER is to be built anyway regardless of whether a Japanese site is chosen, then
the impact on plasma physics research will be about the same, and the relevant
issues on where to site will be more as described in the paper to which these
comments are appended.
4.2 If ITER is sited at Rokkasho, will this be in ad-
dition to or as a substitute for operation of the
spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant there?
It is useful to keep in mind that the cost of operating the Rokkasho reprocessing
plant has been estimated at four billions dollars per year. According to Paul Leven-
thal who quotes this estimate in the 3-5 December 2003 conference paper Verifica-
tion of Nuclear Disarmament on the Korean Peninsula, “Japan could save at least
half the cost of its plutonium-based program if it were to forego separation of pluto-
nium and operation of plutonium-fueled reactors and instead developed a strategic
reserve of low-enriched uranium to ensure uninterrupted operation of its light-water
reactors” (http://www.nci.org/03NCI/12/PL-Jeju-Process.htm# edn3# edn3, acces-
sed January 31, 2004). Actual operating cost estimates for a facility still to be
started up are obviously uncertain, but in any case it seems likely that the savings
from mothballing the Rokkasho plant could nearly or completely pay for switching
to constructing and operating ITER at Rokkasho instead. While some maintain
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that the primary if implicit purpose of reprocessing at Rokkasho is to provide latent
nuclear weapons capability, a more immediate driver is the deal that was made
with this remote prefecture that interim nuclear waste storage will be allowed at
Rokkasho if and only if another major facility is built there as a quid pro quo
economic benefit for the local economy. Under budgetary pressure an obvious
alternative is to build ITER at Rokkasho instead of completing and operating the
reprocessing plant there. Although the alternative of promptly and completely
abandoning building either could ideally be more cost effective, the chances of
this being politically feasible for Japan appear very small.
Should the opportunity arise to substitute ITER for operating the Rokkasho re-
processing plant arise, then the overall impact from an arms control, proliferation,
and nuclear fuel cycle point of view could quite possibly be preferable compared to
proceeding with reprocessing plant operations, particularly if the alternative ends
up being also constructing ITER elsewhere with heavy Japanese participation (this
being the only way ITER can be funded). Careful consideration should be given
to the politics and technicalities of this alternative in any future work done on this
subject. The details would depend on whether this involves abandoning reprocess-
ing plant construction altogether or possibly operating it only on a pilot scale or
even mothballing or dismantling it before it is heavily radioactively contaminated.
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atomic processes nuclear processes
standard chemical detonation fission
processes lasers fusion
acceleration
advanced magnetic compression subcritical fission
processes atomic isomerism nuclear isomerism
x-ray lasers γ-ray lasers
superlasers muon catalysis
antimatter
exotic metallic hydrogen superheavy nuclei
processes atomic clusters bubble nuclei
etc. halo nuclei
etc.
Table 5.1: Major atomic and nuclear processes
of importance to present and future military explosives.
Laser beam driven ICF facilities
Country System name Location Energy No. Wave
[kJ]/[ns] beams length
Glass lasers
USA Omega LLE 3/0.6 24 0.35
Omega-UG LLE 40/3 60 0.35 C
Nova LLNL 50/1 10 0.35 T
NIF LLNL 1800/5 192 0.35 C
Japan Gekko-XII Osaka 30/1 12 1.06
FIREX-II Osaka 50/3 60∼96 0.35 D
Koyo Osaka 4000/6 400 0.35 D
France LULI Palaiseau 0.5/0.6 6 1.06
Octal Limeil 0.9/1 8 1.06
Phébus Limeil 14/2.5 2 0.53 T
Mégajoule Bordeaux 1800/15 288 0.35 C
China Shen-Guang-I Shanghai 1.8/1 2 1.06
Shen-Guang-II Shanghai 6.4/1 8 1.06
Shen-Guang-III Shanghai 60/1 60 0.35 D
UK Helen AWE 1/1 3 0.53
Vulcan RAL 3/1 6 0.53
Russia Delfin Moscow 3/1 108 1.06
India Indore 0.4/3 4 1.06
Italy ABC Frascati 0.2/2 2 0.53
Israel ALADIN Soreq 0.1/3 1 1.06
Continuum Soreq 0.07/7 1 1.06
Germany GSI 0.1/15 1
PHELIX booster GSI 4/10 1 C
South Korea Sinmyung-I Taejon 0.08/0.5 1 1.06
KrF lasers
USA Mercury LANL 1/5 1 0.25
Nike NRL 5/4 56 0.25 C
Japan Ashura Ibaraki 0.7/15 6 0.25
Super-Ashura Ibaraki 7/22 12 0.25 C
UK Sprite RAL 0.09/60 6 0.25
Titania RAL 0.85/0.5 1 0.27
China Tin-Guang Shanghai 0.4/ 1
Iodine lasers
Russia Iskra-5 VNIIEP 15/0.25 12 1.30
Germany Asterix IV Garching 1/0.3 1 1.30 T
Czech Republic PALS Prague 1.2/0.3 1 1.30
Table 5.2: Major operating, planned, or dismantled laser driven ICF facilities.
In the last column C means that the facility is under construction, D that it is in
the design stage, and T that is has been taken to pieces. The wave length is in µm.
Superlasers
Name Location Energy Duration Power Intensity
[J] [ps] [TW] [W/cm2]
USA
Petawatt LLNL(dismantled) 1000.00 20-0.500 (1000.0) > 1021
JanUSP LLNL 15.00 0.085 200.0 2 1021
UM, Ann Arbor 3.00 0.400 4.0 4 1018
Trident LANL 1.50 0.300 5.0 > 1019
UC, San Diego 1.00 0.020 50.0
LABS II LANL 0.25 0.300 ∼ 1.0 1 1019
UM, Ann Arbor 0.07 0.025 3.0
WSU, Pullman 0.06 0.026 2.0
Japan
PW ILE 500.00 0.500 1000.0 > 1020
Petawatt APRC (JAERI) 30.00 0.030 850.0 > 1020
PW-M ILE 60.00 0.500 100.0 > 1019
RIKEN 0.05 0.500 ∼ 0.1 1 1017
UK
Vulcan RAL 360.00 0.700 500.0 5 1020
Astra RAL 1.00 0.100 ∼ 10.0
Titania RAL 1.00 0.400 ∼ 2.5
Sprite RAL 0.25 0.380 ∼ 0.7 4 1017
France
Petawatt CESTA, Bordeaux 1000.00 1.000 1000.0 Constr.
P-102 CEL-V, Limeil 50.00 0.500 80.0 > 1019
LOA, Palaiseau 0.80 0.030 30.0 5 1019
LOA, Palaiseau 0.03 0.100 ∼ 0.3 1 1018
ELIA U. of Bordeaux 0.01 0.010 1.0 1 1018
Germany
PHELIX GSI, Darmstadt 1300.00 0.420 ∼ 1000.0 Constr.
Ti-Nd MBI, Berlin 10.00 0.100 ∼ 100.0 Constr.
ATLAS MPQ, Garching 5.00 0.100 ∼ 100.0 Constr.
Ti MBI, Berlin 0.30 0.032 ∼ 10.0 < 1019
ATLAS MPQ, Garching 0.80 0.130 ∼ 5.0 < 1018
IOQ, Jena 0.22 0.110 ∼ 2.2 < 1018
Russia
Progress-P St. Petersburg 55.00 1.500 ∼ 30.0 1 1019
China
BM ∼ 3.0
Table 5.3: Major operating or planned superlaser facilities.
Interactions of superlasers with matter are qualitatively very different from those of
ordinary lasers because they have sufficient power (i.e., petawatt level) to induce
strong relativistic, multi-photon, nonlinear, and direct nuclear (e.g., fission or
fusion) effects.
Particle beam driven ICF facilities
Country System name Location Energy No.
[kJ]/[ns] beams
USA Saturn SNL 400/5 36
PBFA–Z SNL 1500/20 36
ILSE LBL 6400/10 16 D
Germany KALIF Karlsruhe 40/40 1
HIBALL 5000/20 20 D
Europe HIDIF 3000/6 48 D
Table 5.4: Major operating or planned particle-beam driven ICF facilities.
In the last column D means that the facility is in the design stage.
Reactions → Products
− absorption plus leakage
− consumption
+ heat
Fusion D + T → n + 17.6MeV
breeder n +Be → 2.3n− 0.7n
1.6n+ Li → 1.6T − 1T + 7.7MeV
Total: 0.6T + 25MeV
Fission n + 235U → 2.5n− 0.9n− 1n+ 200MeV
breeder 0.6n+ Li → 0.6T + 3MeV
Total: 0.6T + 200MeV
Table 5.5: Fusion and fission tritium breeding reactions in dedicated facilities.
Adapted from W.A. Lokke and T.K. Fowler, Report UCRL–94003, Lawrence Liv-
ermore National Laboratory (1986).
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Figure   1 Provided a few grams of tritium are available, an unsophisticated "boosted"
fission explosive will weigh less than 100 kg.  With present-day technology,
making and weaponizing such a weapon can be easier than a Nagasaki-type bomb.
Figure 6.1: Comparison of Nagasaki-type and tritium-boosted A-bombs
R ≈ 6 cm
uncompressed pit compressed pit
R ≈ 0.4 cm
5 cm
4 kg  Pu       /U239     235
1 dm   DT3
at 10 atm
R ≈ 3. 9cm
   ≈ 3{
 ≈ 2.5
R ≈ 2.7 cm{
   ≈ 30
R ≈ 0.4 cm{
4 kg steel
2.2 g DT
χ
χ
χ
Boosting
Figure 2 Fissile material pit containing  2.2 g  of deuterium tritium fusion fuel shown
before and after compression by the shock waves generated by about  10 kg
of high explosives.
Figure 6.2: Principle of tritium-boosted A-bombs
       
A-bomb
fusion  fuel
radiation case
hohlraum
sparkplug
pusher/tamper
primary
secondary
X-rays
Teller-Ulam-Sakharov-Zel'dovich  principle
5 cm
Figure 3: "In thermonuclear weapons, radiation from a fission explosive can be contained
and used to transfer energy to compress and ignite a physically separate
component containing thermonuclear fuel. (February 1979)".
Reference: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Declassification, "Drawing back
the curtain of secrecy - Restricted data declassification policy, 1946 to present",
RDD-1,  (June 1, 1994) page 94.
Figure 6.3: Teller-Ulam principle of two-stage H-bombs
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Li   D  fuel6
DT fuze
DT booster
Figure   4  Spherical symmetry of the secondary enables to reach the highest
thermonuclear burn efficiency. A reentry vehicle weight of  200 kg  for a 150 -
300 kt yield is almost the engineering limit. The lower yield is obtained with
a U-238 pusher, while U-235 or plutonium (of any grade) gives the higher yield.  
Figure 6.4: Modern 150 - 300 kt yield reentry vehicle
        
Advanced indirect-drive ICF target ( 5 mg DT fuel )
1 cm
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DT
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Figure 5: "In some ICF targets, radiation from the conversion of the focussed energy
(e.g   laser or particle beam) can be contained and used to transfer energy
to compress and ignite a physically separate component containing
thermonuclear fuel. (February 1979)".
Reference: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Declassification,
"Drawing back the curtain of secrecy - Restricted data declassification
policy, 1946 to present", RDD-1,  (June 1, 1994) page 103.
Figure 6.5: Advanced indirect-drive ICF target
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Figure 6.   Total energy versus energy density for primary hydrodynamic tests (DARHT),
pulsed power facilities (Saturn, Pegasus, Atlas and Jupiter), inertial confinement
fusion facilities (NOVA and NIF), and weapons tests.  The French LMJ, and the
Japanese laser FIREX-II with fast ignition, will have characteristics similar to NIF.
Figure 6.6: Total energy versus energy density
